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Abstract

Swedish Migration Politics: Have the Sweden Democrats Taken Over the Political Agenda?
by
Sofia Sedergren

Advisor: John Bowman

The Sweden Democrats’ anti-immigration rhetoric has gained increased influence over
Swedish politics in recent years as mainstream parties have adopted an increasingly restrictive
attitude towards immigration. Despite this rapprochement to the Sweden Democrats, mainstream
parties continue to articulate their opposition to the party. My thesis examines if and how the
Sweden Democrats have impacted mainstream parties’ immigration rhetoric in their election
manifestos, and if changes on immigration postures have impacted political issues related to
immigration, such as foreign policy and welfare; I also assess if the Sweden Democrats have
introduced new policy issues and views to the political discourse. I discover that, while the
Sweden Democrats have successfully impacted the debate on immigration and directly related
issues by making mainstream parties more restrictive, the party has been unable to introduce new
political issues or influence mainstream parties’ positions on topics which do not relate to
immigration. I further conclude that the convergence between the Sweden Democrats and
mainstream parties occurs in both directions; while mainstream parties are moving closer to the
Sweden Democrats’ immigration posture, the Sweden Democrats are also becoming more
mainstream by developing policy positions on issues other than immigration.
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Introduction
Right-wing parties have increased their political presence in Europe since the 1980s and
have contributed to an increasingly negative debate surrounding immigration.1 In Sweden, the
Sweden Democrats were elected to the Swedish Parliament in 2010, but mainstream parties have
continuously refused to formally collaborate with the party.2 Despite the mainstream parties’
isolation of the Sweden Democrats, they have adopted a more restrictive migration rhetoric and
passed policy proposal which align with the Sweden Democrats’ anti-immigration agenda.3 The
emergence of stricter immigration rhetoric and policy suggests that the Sweden Democrats’
rhetoric has spread within the political establishment, radicalizing mainstream parties.4
Recent events, including the increased influx of immigrants to Europe in 2015, and the
growing electoral strength of the Sweden Democrats, have certainly driven mainstream parties to
adopt more restrictive immigration policies, but is it also true that these events influenced
Swedish politics more broadly by impacting the parties’ political vision of Sweden? Immigration
policy and rhetoric do not exist in a vacuum, but have clear connections to other policy areas,
such as education, foreign policy, social issues etc. These political issues are central to the

1

Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, 1 edition (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2007); Cas Mudde, “Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So
What?,” European Journal of Political Research 52, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 1–19, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14756765.2012.02065.x; Hans-Georg Betz et al., Movements Of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism In The
Western World, ed. Jens Rydgren (New York: Nova Science Pub Inc, 2005); Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, “What Unites
Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?: Re-Examining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful
Cases,” Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 3–23,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414006294168; Piero Ignazi, “Scandinavia: The Progress Parties Between Protest and
Extremism,” in Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe, 1 edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 140–
61; Matthijs Rooduijn et al., “Radical Distinction: Support for Radical Left and Radical Right Parties in Europe,”
European Union Politics 18, no. 4 (December 1, 2017): 536–59, https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116517718091.
2
Monica Saarinen and Daniel Alling, Stefan Löfven (S) frågas ut inför valet 2018 - Valet 2018 (Radio
Sweden, 2018); Hedvig Eriksson, “Ulf Kristersson: Jag var beredd att utmana Åkesson i riksdagen,” Sveriges
Television, October 14, 2018, sec. Inrikes.
3
Sverigedemokraterna, “Vi väljer välfärd: Sverigedemokratiskt valmanifest - valet 2014,” August 25,
2014, 7; “Riksdagen har beslutat att tillfälligt begränsa möjligheten att få uppehållstillstånd i Sverige,” text, accessed
December 14, 2017.
4
Michael Minkenberg, “The Radical Right in Europe” (Presentation, November 13, 2018).
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mainstream parties’ plan for Sweden, both for the relationship between the state and the people
and for the role of Sweden in Europe. Changing views of migration can, therefore, impact the
development of other policy issues, which affects Swedish politics far beyond immigration. In
this study, I look beyond the immigration issue as narrowly conceived and examine Sweden’s
three largest parties’ public positions on a wider range of political issues. A broader examination
highlights to what extent the vision of Sweden’s future, as offered by the mainstream parties, has
been impacted by the Sweden Democrats. By extension, I assess to what degree the Sweden
Democrats impact politics, despite being excluded from collaboration with other parties.5
I proceed through a systematic analysis of the Moderates’ (Moderaterna, mainstream
right party), the Social Democrats’ (Socialdemokraterna, mainstream left party), and the Sweden
Democrats’ (Sverigedemokraterna, right-wing party) election manifestos. Unlike statements
made in the heat of campaigns, election manifestos represent a more comprehensive and closely
considered image of the future as envisioned by the political parties. Election manifestos inform
the voters of the parties’ plans for the country and are also well-suited for examining degrees of
conflict between the parties.6 Accordingly, shifts in rhetoric and policies presented in the
manifestos reveal longer-term changes in the parties’ political positions than gambits presented
during the election campaign.
The impact of rhetoric on politics has been studied for centuries, beginning with
Aristotle.7 Since then, the study of political rhetoric has expanded to not only include rhetoric
itself, but also the ways in which rhetoric changes people’s understanding of reality. The rhetoric
5

At the end of March 2019, the Christian Democratic Party opened for collaboration with the Sweden
Democrats. However, since the examination of election manifestos only cover election materials through the 2018
election, this shift does not impact the analysis. Gilda Hamidi-Nia, “KD-ledaren öppnar för SD-samarbete,” SVT
Nyheter, March 21, 2019, sec. Inrikes, https://www.svt.se/nyheter/inrikes/kd-ledaren-oppnar-for-sd-samarbete.
6
Odmalm Pontus and Super Betsy, “Getting the Balance Right? Party Competition on Immigration and
Conflicting Ideological ‘Pulls,’” Scandinavian Political Studies 37, no. 3 (June 4, 2014): 306,
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12028.
7
Aristotle, “Book I,” in Rhetoric, trans. W. Rhys Roberts (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 2004), 8–9.
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deployed by politicians both communicates the party’s political position and shape the view of
the world.8 Immigration rhetoric more specifically can be used either to transfer and develop the
social aspects of racism,9 or to advance a counternarrative to xenophobic accounts depending on
the chosen rhetorical frame.10 Political rhetoric’s profound impact on politics is exemplified
through my analysis of the Swedish parties’ election manifestos. The examination highlights
how the rhetoric adopted by the Swedish parties (1) communicate their position on immigration,
(2) impact the view of the immigrant, and (3) influence the parties’ view of the world.
My research of shifting rhetoric and policy proposals in Swedish politics is guided by
three research questions: 1. Has the rhetoric surrounding migration in the Moderates’, the Social
Democrats’, and the Sweden Democrats’ election manifestos changed 1998-2018? 2. Has the
increased focus on migration impacted other political issues in the parties’ election manifestos?
3. Have mainstream parties adopted new issues or views which originated with the Sweden
Democrats? I expect that the Sweden Democrats’ migration rhetoric has remained stable in the
party’s election manifestos since 1998, while the mainstream parties have adopted an
increasingly restrictive rhetoric in relation to migration.11 I further anticipate that rhetoric
pertaining to immigration in the mainstream parties’ election manifestos has gained increased
importance in later years and is more clearly connected to other political issues. In the Sweden
Democrats’ election manifestos, I only presume a minor shift, as immigration has been central to

8

Marianne Jørgensen and Louise Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (Los Angeles, Calif:
Sage, 2011), 1, http://methods.sagepub.com.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/book/discourse-analysis-as-theory-and-method;
Jan-Paul Brekke and Tordis Borchgrevink, “Talking about Integration : Discources, Alliances and Theories on
Labour Market Integration in Sweden,” 2007, 15, https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/handle/11250/177583.
9
Teun A. van Dijk, Communicating Racism: Ethnic Prejudice in Thought and Talk, 6. print. (Newbury
Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1995), 383.
10
Bonnie Honig, “Narratives and Foreigners: Switching the Question,” in Democracy and the Foreigner
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 11.
11
Björn Lindqvist, “Sverigedemokraternas Migrationspolitik: En studie av partiets politiska förslag under
perioden 1989-2012 / The Sweden Democrat’s migration policy: A study of the party’s policy proposals during the
period 1989-2012” (Karlstads Universitet, 2012).
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the party since its founding. I also anticipate that the Sweden Democrats have successfully
influenced the mainstream parties’ political views on issues linked to immigration, but that the
party has been unable to alter the political agenda on issues which are not tied to migration in the
political debate.12
The Sweden Democrats’ impact on Swedish politics has been examined from several
perspectives, but there is only limited research on the party’s impact on political issues beyond
immigration.13 My research on shifts in immigration rhetoric in Sweden adds to the scholarly
literature by providing a critical analysis of how and if the Sweden Democrats’ rhetoric
influences mainstream parties’ political positions beyond migration, even when the party remains
outside the accepted political domain;14 my examination also adds to the political debate in
Sweden as it clarifies the parties’ long-term vision of Sweden. To set the stage for the analysis of
the manifestos, I provide an overview of the rise of the Sweden Democrats in Swedish politics,
followed by a summary of voter preferences and the Swedish political context.

The Rise of the Sweden Democrats in Swedish Politics
Since the Sweden Democrats’ founding in 1988, the party has gone through several
reformation processes and has shifted its position from biological racism to “cultural national
chauvinism.”15 This transformation created a respectable façade for the party, increasing its

12

Karl Loxbo, “Voters’ Perceptions of Policy Convergence and the Short‐term Opportunities of Anti‐
immigrant Parties: Examples from Sweden,” Scandinavian Political Studies 37, no. 3 (May 14, 2014): 239–62,
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12025.
13
Loxbo; Disa Hasselberg, “The Limits of Hospitality: The Impact of SD on Immigration Discourses
among the Swedish Political Elite 2006-2016” (Uppsala University, 2016), http://uu.divaportal.org/smash/get/diva2:1039857/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
14
Anders Hellström and Tom Nilsson, “‘We Are the Good Guys’: Ideological Positioning of the
Nationalist Party Sverigedemokraterna in Contemporary Swedish Politics,” Ethnicities 10, no. 1 (March 2010): 55–
76, https://doi.org/10.1177/1468796809354214.
15
Ernesto Dal Bó et al., “Economic Losers and Political Winners: Sweden’s Radical Right,” August 2018,
5.
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support among voters.16 The current party leader, Jimmie Åkesson, was elected in 2005, and has
continued the work to reform the party by moving away from overt Nazism and racism.17 In
2012, Åkesson proclaimed a zero-tolerance policy for racism within the party;18 however, racism
scandals related to high-profile Sweden Democrats continue to unfold.19
The Sweden Democrats were first elected into the Swedish parliament in 2010 with 5.7
% of the votes, and gained additional voter support in the 2014 general election, which made the
party the third largest in the Swedish parliament.20 The Sweden Democrats have continued to
increase their voter base, and won 17.5 % of the votes in the 2018 general election.21 Thus, the
Sweden Democrats’ legitimacy among Swedish voters has increased significantly. However, this
has only recently started to spread to the political elite, and the majority of mainstream parties
still consider the Sweden Democrats a pariah party.22
Despite most mainstream parties’ refusal to formally collaborate with the Sweden
Democrats, the party’s stance on migration has gained increased acceptance among Swedish
political parties.23 In 2015, the Swedish government proposed a more restrictive migration policy

16

Jens Rydgren and Patrick Ruth, “Contextual Explanations of Radical Right-Wing Support in Sweden:
Socioeconomic Marginalization, Group Threat, and the Halo Effect,” Ethnic & Racial Studies 36, no. 4 (April
2013): 714, https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2011.623786.
17
Expo, “Sverigedemokraterna,” Expo.se, October 3, 2018.
18
Radio Sweden, “Bakgrund: Sverigedemokraterna – detta har hänt - Nyheter (Ekot),” December 20, 2012.
19
Expo, “Sverigedemokraterna”; Radio Sweden, “Bakgrund: Sverigedemokraterna – detta har hänt Nyheter (Ekot).”
20
Valmyndigheten, “Röster - Val 2010,” September 23, 2010,
https://data.val.se/val/val2010/slutresultat/R/rike/index.html; Valmyndigheten, “Röster - Val 2014,” September 19,
2014, https://data.val.se/val/val2014/slutresultat/R/rike/index.html.
21
The Social Democrats were the largest party in Sweden with 28.26 % of the votes and the Moderates the
second largest party, gaining 19.84 % of the votes in the 2018 election. Valmyndigheten, “Valresultat 2018,” text,
October 8, 2018, https://www.val.se/valresultat/riksdag-landsting-och-kommun/2018/valresultat.html.
22
Hamidi-Nia, “KD-ledaren öppnar för SD-samarbete.”
23
Based on parliamentary praxis, the Sweden Democrats’ representative Björn Söder received the position
as second vice speaker of parliament in 2014, but lost this role after the 2018 general election when the Left Party
put forth a challenging candidate for the position. Riksdagsförvaltningen, “Urban Ahlin vald till ny talman,”
September 29, 2014; Riksdagsförvaltningen, “Andreas Norlén vald till ny talman,” September 27, 2018..
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after a shift in the immigration debate following the increased influx of migrants to Europe.24
The Swedish government (consisting of the Social Democrats and the Green Party) reached an
agreement with the Alliance (consisting of the Moderate Party, the Center Party, the People’s
Party/the Liberals, and the Christian Democratic Party) in October 2015 to temporarily restrict
migration to Sweden.25 Additionally, Sweden imposed ID controls on its border with Denmark to
further decrease the inflow of migrants.26 These regulations are still in place as of April 2019,
and the Social Democrats and the Moderates have proposed making these changes semipermanent or permanent.27 The shift in the mainstream parties’ approach to migration suggests
that their political positions have moved closer to the Sweden Democrats, despite the ongoing
rejection of the party.28

Swedish Voter Preferences and the Political Context
In the following section, I provide a brief overview of voter preferences and the broader
political context in Sweden to better understand the parties’ focus in the election manifestos and
their description of Swedish society. Voter preferences are established by examining the five
most important topics to voters by election, and the interest in immigration as a political issue. In
regard to the political context, I examine data for immigration levels, the number of reported
crimes, unemployment levels, and education results. These variables were chosen as they
24

Disa Hasselberg, “The Limits of Hospitality: The Impact of SD on Immigration Discourses among the
Swedish Political Elite 2006-2016” (Uppsala University, 2016), 59.
25
Temporary residency permits and an economic self-sufficiency requirement to be granted family
reunification are examples of provisions introduced through the new bill. Regeringen och Regeringskansliet,
“Insatser med anledning av flyktingkrisen,” October 23, 2015.
26
Regeringen och Regeringskansliet, “Regeringen beslutar att tillfälligt återinföra gränskontroll vid inre
gräns,” Text, Regeringskansliet, November 12, 2015.
27
Socialdemokraterna, “Valmanifest 2018: Det största trygghetsprogrammet i modern tid” (Åtta 45
Tryckeri AB, 2018), 17; Nya Moderaterna, “Nu Tar vi Tag i Sverige: Valmanifest 2018” (Strokirk-Landströms,
August 2018), 15.
28
Hasselberg, “The Limits of Hospitality: The Impact of SD on Immigration Discourses among the
Swedish Political Elite 2006-2016”; Eriksson, “Ulf Kristersson.”
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connect to recurring topics discussed in relation to immigration in the political debate. Changes
in these factors are significant as they impact the political context, and by extension, the parties’
rhetoric and political agenda.
The trend for voter preferences is relatively stable and welfare/healthcare, education, and
employment are consistently ranked as top issues (see Table 1); immigration did not occur as a
top five issue until the 2014 election, though 10 % of voters ranked it at the top in 2002. Since
immigration has only recently appeared as a prioritized issue, mainstream parties are less likely
to emphasize immigration in the earlier manifestos.

Most Important Issues for Voters in General Elections 1998-2018
1998
Employment
34 %
Welfare/
Healthcare
28 %
Education
20 %
Pension/Elder
Care 17 %

2002
Welfare/Health
care 36 %
Education
29 %

Taxes 17 %

Pensions/Elder
Care 20 %
Family
Policies/Child
Care 15 %
Taxes 14 %

Immigration/
Refugees 3 %

Immigration/R
efugees 10 %

2006
Employment
35 %
Welfare/
Healthcare
32 %
Education
24 %
Pensions/Elder
Care 21 %

2010
Welfare/Health
care 37 %
Employment
31 %

2014
Welfare/Health
care 43 %
Education
41 %

Education 26 %

Employment
23 %
Immigration/
Refugees 23 %

Taxes 15 %

Taxes 15 %

Immigration/
Refugees 5 %

Immigration/
Refugees 9 %

Pensions/Elder
Care 19 %

Climate and
Environment
20 %

2018
Healthcare
52 %
Immigration/
Refugees
45 %
Crime 34 %
Education
27 %
Integration
23 %

Table 1. Self-reported priority of political issues ahead of general elections 1998-2018. Data for 1998-2014 was
retrieved from the Swedish National Election Studies at the University of Gothenburg and data for 2018 is based on
polls from Metro.se.29 Voters have answered an open-ended question regarding what political issues are most
important to them.

In relation to the Swedish political context, the availability of data varies, and data is not
available for all variables for the entire time period. Figure 1 shows changes in immigration over

29
Svenska Valforskningsprogrammet, “Väljarnas viktigaste valfrågor” (Göteborgs Universitet, November
2018), https://valforskning.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1684/1684327_faktablad-11-viktiga-sakfr--gor.pdf; Linnea
Bergman, “Yougov: Här är väljarnas viktigaste frågor i valslutspurten,” Metro, accessed March 11, 2019,
https://www.metro.se/artikel/yougov-h%C3%A4r-%C3%A4r-v%C3%A4ljarnas-viktigaste-fr%C3%A5gor-ivalslutspurten.
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time and highlights three major shifts in immigration reception in Sweden: first, there was a
sharp increase in immigration between 2005-2006; second, immigration began to increase
steadily after 2011 with a sharp upsurge in 2015; third, there was a significant decrease in
immigration after 2016.

Figure 1. Number of immigrants arriving in Sweden per year 2000-2018. Data was retrieved from Statistics
Sweden.30

The number of reported crimes and unemployment levels have not changed significantly 19982018 but varies throughout the time period.31 Reported crimes and unemployment levels do,
thus, change unrelatedly to immigration flows in Sweden. Results for Swedish students in
international comparisons have dropped since 2000, despite grades improving during the same
time period; this development suggests that Swedish students are learning less compared to

30

“Invandring till Sverige,” Statistiska Centralbyrån, February 21, 2019, http://www.scb.se/hittastatistik/sverige-i-siffror/manniskorna-i-sverige/invandring-till-sverige/.
31
“Anmälda brott,” Brottsförebyggande Rådet (Brå), accessed March 10, 2019,
https://www.bra.se/statistik/kriminalstatistik/anmalda-brott.html; “Befolkningen 15-74 År (AKU) Efter Kön, Ålder
Och Arbetskraftstillhörighet 1998-2018,” Statistiska Centralbyrån, accessed March 10, 2019,
http://www.statistikdatabasen.scb.se/pxweb/sv/ssd/START__AM__AM0401__AM0401A/NAKUBefolkning2Ar/ta
ble/tableViewLayout1/?rxid=c661b002-1371-4ac1-93c3-c1855690bee9.
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students in other countries.32 Results for Swedish students also appear to develop independently
from shifts in immigration, since the changes have been steady. These results are significant in
relation to the parties’ rhetoric connecting these issues to increased immigration.
This thesis has four main parts: first, I offer a review of the literature related to the
increase in anti-immigration rhetoric and policy in Europe and Sweden; second, I outline the
methodology for the project, followed by the analysis of the parties’ election manifestos. Lastly,
I summarize the results of the analysis by highlighting both differences and similarities between
the parties and by offering some reflections on the impact of my research and the possibilities for
future research.

Literature Review
Before examining rhetoric pertaining to immigration in Swedish election manifestos and
its impact on other political issues, I assess the current literature on right-wing parties in Europe
and the Sweden Democrats to situate my research within the current scholarly debate. These two
areas of scholarly literature highlight different aspects which are relevant to understand the
Sweden Democrats’ influence on Swedish politics and are discussed in more depth below. Since
the 1980s, right-wing parties have advanced their political positions all around Europe.33
However, the research examining the role of right-wing parties in European politics has been
inconclusive—scholars have reached mixed conclusions on right-wing parties’ relative
32

Data is available from 2000-2015. Magnus Henrekson and Sebastian Jävervall, “Svenska skolresultat
rasar – vad vet vi?,” accessed March 10, 2019, https://www.iva.se/globalassets/info-trycksaker/iva/201609-ivahenrekson-javervall-i.pdf; “Pisa Country Note, Sweden: Results from Pisa 2015” (Programme for International
Student Assessment (PISA)), accessed March 10, 2019, https://www.oecd.org/pisa/PISA-2015-Sweden.pdf.
33
Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe; Cas Mudde, “Three Decades of Populist Radical
Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?"; Hans-Georg Betz et al., Movements Of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing
Populism In The Western World; Elisabeth Ivarsflaten, “What Unites Right-Wing Populists in Western Europe?: ReExamining Grievance Mobilization Models in Seven Successful Cases”; Piero Ignazi, “Scandinavia: The Progress
Parties Between Protest and Extremism”; Matthijs Rooduijn et al., “Radical Distinction: Support for Radical Left
and Radical Right Parties in Europe”.
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influence.34 As for the Sweden Democrats more specifically, the party’s advancement occurred
late compared to other Nordic countries, due to the view of the Sweden Democrats as extremist
and militant.35 Yet, the Swedish case suggests that the Sweden Democrats have influenced
political rhetoric and policy on a national level in recent years, despite mainstream parties
publicly opposing the party and refusing to collaborate with them. Due to the increased strength
of right-wing parties in Europe and Sweden, it is necessary to look at what previous scholars
have concluded to better understand how the Moderates, the Social Democrats, and the Sweden
Democrats relate to one another and how they have changed over time.

Right-wing Parties in Europe
I study two aspects of the strengthening of right-wing parties in Europe to situate the
Sweden Democrats in the broader European context, and to compare Sweden Democratic
rhetorical strategies with developments in Europe. First, I assess the scholarship on right-wing
party influence in Europe, which highlights the practical and rhetorical impact of right-wing
parties on European politics. The current research outlines distinct immigration narratives in
different European countries, which I relate to dominant immigration discourses in the Swedish
debate. The rhetoric in the Swedish election manifestos can be assessed based on the strategies
employed by right-wing parties in Europe to gage how the development in Sweden fits with the
changes in other countries; consequently, my research adds additional clarity regarding the

34

Michael Minkenberg, “From Pariah to Policy-Maker? The Radical Right in Europe, West and East:
Between Margin and Mainstream,” Journal of Contemporary European Studies 21, no. 1 (March 1, 2013): 5–24;
Cas Mudde, “Three Decades of Populist Radical Right Parties in Western Europe: So What?,” European Journal of
Political Research 52, no. 1 (January 1, 2013): 1–19; Michelle Hale Williams, “Are Radical Right-Wing Parties the
Black Holes in Party Space? Implications and Limitations in Impact Assessment of Radical Right-Wing Parties,”
Ethnic & Racial Studies 38, no. 8 (June 15, 2015): 1329–38.
35
Jungar Ann‐Cathrine and Jupskås Anders Ravik, “Populist Radical Right Parties in the Nordic Region: A
New and Distinct Party Family?,” Scandinavian Political Studies 37, no. 3 (July 29, 2014): 216,
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9477.12024.
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immigration narratives which dominate the political debate. More broadly, my examination of
Swedish election manifestos highlights the complexity of anti-immigration rhetoric and its
connection to other political issues. This complexity makes it arduous, if not impossible, to
isolate one effect which increases the influence of right-wing parties, as a plethora of factors
impact the parties’ success. Second, I examine analyses of the factors which impact right-wing
party support. While my research does not examine people’s reasoning for supporting stricter
immigration positions, these explanations are useful to understand the arguments the parties’
make in their election manifestos. In the same manner as the examination of right-wing party
rhetoric in Europe provides a framework for analyzing the types of anti-immigration rhetoric in
the election manifestos, the explanations for right-wing party support offer potential approaches
for the parties to use to catch voters’ attention.

Right-wing Party Influence
A main reason for the disagreement on right-wing party influence in Europe is that there
are major methodological challenges leading scholars to draw distinct conclusions regarding
right-wing party support. Michelle Hale Williams notes that a main reason for the division in
previous scholarship is that influence is often difficult to measure, and scholars use different
strategies to gage the impact of right-wing parties; these methodological variances makes it
difficult to cross-examine right-wing parties’ success.36 Williams further argues that to only
examine electoral outcomes does not accurately measure right-wing party success, as right-wing
parties do not only impact policy, but the party system as well; the latter effects are often greater

36

Williams, “Are Radical Right-Wing Parties the Black Holes in Party Space?”
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than the former.37 Right-wing parties arise in a policy vacuum and that their position is identified
in relation to mainstream parties; right-wing party impact is contingent on both the party system
competition and mainstream party agency.38 Ernesto Dal Bó, Frederico Finan, Olle Folke,
Torsten Persson, and Johanna Rickne highlight a similar process, where mainstream parties’
platform conversion opened up an ideological space for right-wing parties to mobilize.39 Bó et al.
and Williams’ findings stress the importance of examining both the convergence, and the shift
among mainstream parties on issues relating to immigration. Along these lines, I study both the
concrete policy proposals which have changed among mainstream parties after the rise of the
Sweden Democrats and the shift in the parties’ relationship to one another, thereby using Sweden
as a practical example of Bó et al. and Williams’ theories of right-wing party advancement.
The difficulty in isolating right-wing parties’ impact on policy issues and the political
system is illustrated by Jennifer Hochschild and John Mollenkopf, who conclude that European
political and state actors have adopted and legitimized some of the radical rights’ claims due to
its increased strength. The mainstream parties’ newfound acceptance gives right-wing
movements greater influence over politics and suggests a break from previously established
histories of ignoring right-wing parties.40 This conclusion is confirmed by Michael Minkenberg,
who finds that the shift from exclusion to partial collaboration with right-wing parties have
strengthened their position in relation to mainstream parties.41 However, these results are mixed
and full collaboration has, in some cases, resulted in a weakening of the right-wing party while
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other parties have remained stable.42 Hochschild and Mollenkopf argue that the influence of
right-wing parties in Europe is limited and while they have advanced their positions politically,
their overall impact on immigration policy is minor.43 If Hochschild and Mollenkopf are correct,
the mainstream parties in Sweden will have embraced some of the Sweden Democrats’ rhetoric,
but refrained from adopting far-reaching policy proposals which align with the Sweden
Democratic anti-immigration agenda.
Another central aspect of right-wing party influence is their ability to shape the political
agenda. Teun A. van Dijk and Ruth Wodak find that prejudice and racism would be less
influential if stories about immigrants were not communicated by the ‘elite.’44 Their conclusion
emphasizes the importance of examining political discourse due to its impact on people’s view of
immigration. Dijk also summarizes several dominating themes in anti-immigration rhetoric by
identifying 15 types of discourses:
“Too many of them [immigrants] are (coming) here, immigration should become
stricter, they make us feel unsafe on the streets, the neighborhood is being run
down by them, they are aggressive and involved in crime, some of them work
hard but many of them are lazy and on welfare (for which we pay taxes), they
take our houses and jobs and are unfairly favored by the government, they do not
adapt to our ways, do not speak our language or do have strange religion and
other customs, they do not value education as we do, have too many children, do
not respect their women, live in dirty places, and in general are different and have
different mentality–they do not belong here.”45
The above quote highlights the many forms anti-immigration rhetoric can take and provides a
crucial aspect of my analysis of Swedish parties’ anti-immigration rhetoric. By examining the
parties’ rhetoric in relation to these different narratives, I can determine if there is one dominant
42
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immigration story in Sweden or if the parties employ a multitude of approaches to describe
immigration. I employ Dijk’s categories of racist discourse on a new set of data by looking at
rhetoric in election manifestos rather than accounts in the media, fiction, or interpersonal
communication which have been emphasized in the past.46 This approach will highlight whether
or not political rhetoric align with discourses in other forums.
Dijk’s summary of anti-immigration rhetoric is not all-encompassing but focuses on the
description of the immigrant. Dorine Boumans offers a different perspective on anti-immigration
rhetoric by emphasizing the rhetorical separation between “the pure people” and “the corrupt
elite.”47 Her conclusion that the relationship between the people and the elite is important to the
rise of right-wing parties is supported by Frank Mols and Jolanda Jetten, who find that an
emphasis on voter victimhood is central for right-wing party support. Mols and Jetten conclude
that right-wing party rhetoric in Australia and the Netherlands focuses on creating a division
between “hard-working taxpayers,”48 on the one hand, and the elite and immigrants, on the
other.49 These are examples of a different narrative to track in the Swedish parties’ election
manifestos, namely ‘the people versus the elite,’ to examine if it is a strategy employed by
Swedish parties.
An additional explanation for the increased acceptance of anti-immigration rhetoric in
Europe is the change in focus, from racism to Islamophobia. Minkenberg concludes that
Islamophobia is widespread in Western Europe, which gives right-wing parties an opportunity to
look more mainstream compared to their previous racist and anti-Semitic discourses.50 The same
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idea is advanced by Farid Hafez, who discovers that “… Islamophobic claims are regarded as
much less ‘problematic’, and a much more widely held form of racism in western societies, than
antisemitism.”51 This conclusion aligns with Ferruh Yilmaz’s finding that the sustained focus on
Muslims and Islam in right-wing discourse highlights cultural differences between immigrants
and natives.52 Right-wing parties’ employment of these narratives results in a portrayal of
Muslims as culturally inferior, while they also pose a threat to Western civilization.53 The
emphasis on immigrants’ distinctive culture is also evident in the Swedish political discourse;
Disa Hasselberg argues that Swedish parties have shifted from racist ideas to an emphasis on
culture.54 The shift from focusing on racial attributes to an emphasis on culture made it easier for
right-wing parties to express anti-immigration sentiments without appearing racist.55 The
examination of Swedish election manifestos highlights if this rhetoric has spread from political
debates to the parties’ vision of the future as outlined in the manifestos. Hasselberg’s research on
immigration rhetoric in Sweden is discussed in more depth in the section on the Sweden
Democrats.
Right-wing Party Support
In addition to the analysis of right-wing party influence on the political system and
rhetoric, right-wing party success is also studied by examining the factors that motivate voters to
support right-wing parties. These two discussions are largely developing separately, with little
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consideration for how the two processes impact one another.56 Right-wing voter mobilization is
explained by several distinct factors: socio-political, rhetorical, and spatial. Valeria Bello focuses
on the socio-political factors which impact citizens’ attitudes toward immigrants, and concludes
that if inclusivity is highlighted as a central socio-political value, individuals show more positive
attitudes toward immigrants.57 Bello’s conclusion suggests that the state has tremendous
influence over people’s opinions and that politicians, by crafting either an inclusive or exclusive
social identity for the country, can impact general attitudes toward immigrants.
However, Miriam Cihodariu and Lucian-Stefan Dumitrescu suggest that anti-immigrant
dialogue is often confusing and that integration, assimilation, and multiculturalism are often used
interchangeably.58 Due to the ambiguity of what integration entails, multiculturalist policy
failures are blamed on immigrants.59 By including both Bello’s, and Cihodariu’s and
Dumitrescu’s perspectives, I suggest that while there is an opportunity for politicians to create
more inclusive public sentiments, the confusion in the debate has obstructed such a development,
leading to a more negative view of the immigrant. Bello’s conclusion suggests that Sweden is
moving from more inclusive to more restrictive socio-political identity constructions, which
increases the level of intolerance towards immigrants. In combination with the lack of clarity in
the debate, as outlined by Cihodariu and Dumitrescu, the blame for the failure of previous
policies is placed on the immigrants.
The spatial relationship between immigrants and the majority group is also important for
understanding right-wing party support. Carl Berning, Jocelyn Evans, Myles Gould, Eelco
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Harteveld, and Gilles Ivaldi find that in areas with lower ethnic diversity, people are more prone
to vote for right-wing parties, especially if neighboring areas have higher levels of ethnic
diversity.60 The difference in attitudes toward immigration in a Swedish setting is examined by
Sarah Valdez, through the study of how the influx versus the residency level of immigrants
impact right-wing party support. She finds that much of the support for right-wing parties on a
district level “… can be accounted for by the percent of non-western residents in adjacent
neighborhoods.”61 The manner in which immigrants and the majority group (i.e. Swedes) interact
with one another is crucial for how contact between the two groups impacts right-wing party
support. Valdez concludes that meaningful contact (i.e. friendships) makes people overcome
prejudice, while superficial contact (i.e. day to day interactions) increases prejudice.62 Robert
Miles articulates a similar distinction by differentiating between the experienced and imagined
other, where the former generates more positive and the latter more negative attitudes toward
immigrants.63 These findings are exemplified in Bó et al.’s study which concludes that high
numbers of immigrants in the commuting zone results in higher support for the Sweden
Democrats.64 While my examination of election manifestos does not treat spatial variance in
right-wing party support, Valdez, Miles, and Bó et al.’s conclusions are important to understand
the parties’ imagination of the immigrant and their arguments relating to segregation.
Last in the examination of right-wing party support, I turn to Jens Rydgren and Patrick
Ruth’s study on how the origin of immigrants impacts right-wing party support. Rydgren and
Ruth find that, while the origin of migrants (i.e. Nordic, European, or non-European immigrant)
60
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matters for the salience of right-wing party support, immigration from non-European countries is
negatively correlated with support for the Sweden Democrats, which suggests that non-European
immigrant presence by itself is not enough to increase right-wing party support.65 Rather,
socioeconomic factors play a central role in explaining support for the Sweden Democrats.66 This
is in line with Bó et al.’s finding that increased inequality leads to increased support for the
Sweden Democrats, and that vulnerability is a crucial aspect of right-wing party support.67 These
discoveries suggest that politicians’ rhetorical focus on non-western immigrants as different from
the majority group, as highlighted by Yilmaz, Hasselberg and others, is not an effective way of
increasing support for an anti-immigration agenda, but that parties should highlight the conflict
between a high living standard and immigration to increase people’s dissatisfaction with
immigration. My study highlights if Swedish parties emphasize this perceived conflict, or if the
parties stick to the narrative of the culturally distinct other.
The overview of the literature on right-wing parties in Europe highlights the diverse
perspectives presented by scholars on the topic of right-wing party advancement. Previous
research concludes that right-wing party success is largely dependent on mainstream parties’
actions, and that mainstream parties adjust their position to align with anti-immigration rhetoric
once right-wing parties have gained further support. Additionally, right-wing party scholarship
highlights different types of immigration rhetoric deployed by right-wing parties to increase their
voter base. By complementing this research with manifesto data from the three largest parties in
Sweden, I add additional vigor to the theories describing the relationship between mainstream
and right-wing parties through an example of how mainstream and right-wing parties interact
with one another in Sweden. My data also highlights which rhetorical strategies among right65
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wing parties in Europe that have dominated the Swedish immigration debate. However, to
examine immigration rhetoric is not enough to understand the full extent of right-wing party
influence, and I expand the scope of issues studied to determine if the Sweden Democrats have
impacted mainstream parties’ rhetoric and policy beyond immigration, and, by extension, altered
the mainstream parties’ central vision of Sweden. This adds a broader perspective to the current
literature on right-wing parties’ impact on politics by highlighting how anti-immigration rhetoric
can influence other topics as well.

The Sweden Democrats
To complete my examination of the existing literature, I engage scholarship which
focuses on the Sweden Democrats more specifically. Although no decisive conclusions on the
impact of right-wing parties in Europe have been reached, general trends about the Sweden
Democrats’ advancement have been identified by scholars studying right-wing party presence in
Sweden. Researchers have examined why the Sweden Democrats gain increased support, and
how the party impacts policy and mainstream party relations, both in its emergence and once
elected to political assemblies. In addition, there is an increasing body of literature on the
Sweden Democrats’ politics more specifically and the party’s impact on political rhetoric.68
Despite the diligence of previous examinations, the recent changes in Swedish immigration
policy, and the growth of the Sweden Democrats’ influence over immigration rhetoric warrants
further examination of the topic. Not only is it a chance to confirm previous developments in the
localities on a national level, but it also offers an opportunity to expand the examination of
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Sweden Democratic rhetoric and its impact on other parties. Both these topics have been
examined before, but the majority of previous studies have focused solely on the issue of
immigration, not related topics. By including this additional perspective, my research highlights
if the Sweden Democrats influence politics more broadly. Additionally, most previous studies do
not include changes in the political debate after the increased influx of migrants to Europe in
2015, which significantly impacted the discussion on immigration. The inclusion of the 2018
election manifestos highlight how recent developments have impacted party relations in Sweden.
The Sweden Democrats’ influence on politics is examined by Niklas Bolin, Gustav
Lidén, and Jon Nyhlén, who identify instances in which the Sweden Democrats have
successfully influenced the politics in local municipalities.69 They find that the Sweden
Democrats can exercise either direct influence, by participating in government, or indirect
influence, where mainstream parties adopt the Sweden Democrats’ political positions in an
attempt to limit the party’s influence on politics.70 Bolin et al. conclude that gaining
representation is not enough for the Sweden Democrats to exercise influence; the Sweden
Democrats’ main issue, immigration, must also gain popular attention for the party to
successfully exercise political influence.71 Additionally, the party must hold the balance of power
in legislative assemblies to gain influence over the political agenda.72 These results are
significant as they provide guidance for developments on the national level, where immigration
has emerged as a significant issue for voters in recent elections and the Sweden Democrats have
held the balance of power in parliament. My examination of the Swedish parties’ election
69
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manifestos highlights if the Sweden Democrats have been able to impact the national political
agenda in a way similar to what Bolin at al. have seen on the local level.
The Sweden Democrats’ impact on politics is further examined by Karl Loxbo, who
shifts the focus from the party’s policy influence to whether or not its presence impacts
mainstream parties’ political behavior in relation to one another.73 In opposition to many
European studies of right-wing parties, Loxbo argues that small successes for the Sweden
Democrats have a stronger impact on mainstream parties than previously perceived.74 Loxbo’s
research focuses on the importance of mainstream party response in facilitating right-wing party
success;75 he finds that the Sweden Democrats increase political conflict, which makes it harder
for mainstream parties to collaborate.76 Anders Hellström and Tom Nilsson also note the Sweden
Democrats’ polarizing effect, and find that the Moderates and the Social Democrats tend to
blame one another for the Sweden Democrats’ success in an attempt to distance themselves from
the party.77 Accordingly, the mainstream parties’ response to the Sweden Democrats is central to
the party’s political success.
The findings that Sweden Democratic presence increases political conflict and decreases
collaboration across political differences78 is especially noteworthy in relation to Loxbo’s later
finding: increased policy convergence on immigration issues fuels further support for the
Sweden Democrats if the voters construe the mainstream parties’ positions as too similar.79
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Loxbo predicts that the isolation of the Sweden Democrats will improve the party’s chances in
later elections, as it positions the Sweden Democrats as an alternative to mainstream parties.80
Taken together, Loxbo’s two studies suggest that the Sweden Democrats enjoy increased support
if mainstream parties’ positions on immigration align, but also that the emergence of the Sweden
Democrats increases political polarization and makes it more difficult to form political
coalitions. It is not clear, however, how these processes work together and what it means for the
Sweden Democrats’ future success if the projected polarization among mainstream parties occur.
My examination of the rhetoric on immigration related issues in the election manifestos will
highlight if the Moderates and the Social Democrats have continued to converge on immigration
or if the increased presence of the Sweden Democrats have increased the area of conflict
between the parties.
To better understand the Sweden Democrats’ relationship to other political parties, I turn
to Björn Lindqvist who approaches the study of the Sweden Democrats from a different angle.
Rather than examining how the party impacts other political actors, he analyses the development
of Sweden Democratic political proposals over time. He concludes that the Sweden Democrats’
political vision has remained largely stable since the party’s founding, and that the increased
support for the party is due to changes in public opinion, not changes in the Sweden Democrats’
political policies.81 Instead of developing divergent policies, the Sweden Democrats have used
established political positions and made them more radical, which has allowed them to navigate
the political spectrum more easily.82 Like Loxbo, Lindqvist attributes the success of the Sweden
Democrats to the failure of mainstream parties to address the grievances behind the party’s rise.
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Instead of openly discussing the issues the Sweden Democrats highlight, mainstream parties
have classified the party as extreme and isolated them in an attempt to avoid anti-immigration
influence on political policy; this isolation has led to increased support for the Sweden
Democrats.83 In this regard, the mainstream parties have prioritized the defense of liberal values
over respecting the democratic legitimacy of the Sweden Democrats’ representation in Swedish
politics.84 Mainstream parties have also continued to describe the Sweden Democrats as ‘the ugly
duckling’ to invalidate their political position.85 If the Sweden Democrats’ success is due to the
lack of repositioning among mainstream parties on the issue of immigration, it appears unlikely
that the party has influenced the broader political debate, as the party’s success is entirely based
on immigration. As Lindqvist’s research only examine the Sweden Democrats’ party platforms
and political proposals in parliament, adding data from the election manifestos help confirm his
picture of the Sweden Democrats as a stable party.
The conclusion that the Sweden Democrats have not successfully impacted the greater
political debate is confirmed in Anders Widfeldt’s study of immigration rhetoric among Swedish
parties in the 2002, 2006, and 2010 general elections.86 By examining Swedish parties’ election
manifestos, Widfeldt discovers long-standing tensions among mainstream parties’ coalition
partners on issues of immigration, and the parties have decreased their emphasis on immigration
in an attempt to avoid revealing this conflict.87 Additionally, Widfeldt finds that the mainstream
parties focused less on migration as the Sweden Democrats increased in size, and the party’s rise
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did not significantly impact the mainstream parties’ view of immigration.88
However, Widfeldt’s conclusions were drawn based on data before the shift in migration
flows in Europe in 2015; I choose to examine later developments in Swedish politics to fully
grasp the extent to which the Sweden Democrats interact with the Moderates and the Social
Democrats on different political issues. While I have no reason to assume that my findings in
2002, 2006, and 2010 will be significantly different from Widfeldt’s, my analysis will expand
both the time frame and the scope of study, by including election manifestos from 1998-2018,
and by examining both immigration rhetoric as such and issues which relate to immigration.
Hence, it is possible to discern if the migration debate has changed since Widfeldt conducted his
study, and whether or not immigration rhetoric impacts other political issues. I expect that the
Sweden Democrats will have had a greater impact on immigration policy in later years,
especially after the increased influx of migrants to Europe in 2015. Additionally, I anticipate that
mainstream parties take a more restrictive position on other political issues as well, as they adopt
a more restrictive immigration rhetoric.
Some of the work I set out to do, has already been tested; Hasselberg examines if the
Sweden Democratic rhetoric impacts mainstream parties’ discourse on immigration in parliament
and the media 2006-2016.89 Hasselberg identifies the increased influx of migrants to Europe in
2015 as a catalyst for a more restrictive migration position among Swedish political parties, but
she is not able to isolate the effect of Sweden Democratic rhetoric from the impact of the
perceived crisis of increased immigration. Hasselberg is, therefore, hesitant to draw any wideranging conclusions about the impact of Sweden Democratic rhetoric.90 Regardless of the
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motivation, the shift in mainstream parties’ approach to migration suggests that their political
positions have moved closer to the Sweden Democrats. This has increased the Sweden
Democrats’ impact on the political debate, despite the mainstream parties’ ongoing rejection of
the party.91
Hasselberg proposes that the continuous opposition to the Sweden Democrats is based in
mainstream parties’ desire to self-identify as immigration friendly.92 Such identification feeds
into “… self-glorifying images of Swedish hospitality and goodness,”93 which leads to
expressions of covert nationalism, as notions of what is good is linked to the nation. Swedish
parties can then frame immigrants who depart from the Swedish norms of gender equality and
tolerance as bad by opposing immigration based on culture rather than racist ideals.94 The focus
on cultural difference allows the Sweden Democrats, and more recently mainstream parties, to
oppose immigrants on a universal, liberal democracy basis instead of appearing intolerant.95
Hasselberg’s conclusions align with the development in the rest of Europe, where cultural
differentiation rather than ethnic disparities is highlighted.96 Her research also suggests that the
Sweden Democratic rhetoric has impacted the political debate in a manner which has not been
acknowledged by other scholars. I continue to explore this shift by examining election
manifestos published 1998-2018 to discern the Sweden Democrats’ impact on both immigration
and other political issues, which Hasselberg does not examine.
The scholarly research on the Sweden Democrats shows a clear trend towards more
Sweden Democratic presence in Swedish politics, on both a local and national level. However,
91
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since the Sweden Democrats’ rhetoric has only recently impacted Swedish immigration politics,
more current data are needed to fully understand the impact of the party. Not until after the shift
in migration flows in Europe did Sweden change its migration legislation, which highlights the
importance of studying the changes in immigration rhetoric in the most recent election.
Additionally, research on the Sweden Democrats’ impact beyond migration is limited, though
immigration is often discussed in relation to other political issues. My research broadens the
scope of study to determine the extent to which the Sweden Democrats impact mainstream
parties’ political positions on both immigration and relating issues. The use of election manifesto
data, rather than data from political debates, also reveals if the Sweden Democrats have
influenced politics beyond debate gimmicks, by impacting the mainstream parties’ medium- to
long-term vision of Sweden as presented in the manifestos.

Methodology
As evidenced by the discussion above, the scholarly examination of political rhetoric and
the influence of right-wing parties is extensive, but there is no agreement on the exact role of
right-wing parties on European politics. In several countries, right-wing parties have grown and
increased their political significance, and the emergence of the Sweden Democrats in Sweden is
no exception. Historically, mainstream parties have successfully blocked the Sweden Democrats
from influencing Swedish politics and the policy process.97 However, with the increased influx
of migrants to Europe, and Sweden, in 2015, mainstream parties’ rhetoric surrounding
immigration has hardened, but the parties continue to emphasize their differentiation from the
Sweden Democrats.
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Hasselberg’s research on political rhetoric in the media and parliament, and Widfeldt’s
examination of immigration rhetoric in Swedish election manifestos most closely mirror my own
investigation, but there are some significant differences; neither study includes questions about
how the political landscape has shifted more broadly due to parties’ connections between
immigration and other political issues, but only examines immigration rhetoric more narrowly
conceived. I examine mainstream parties’ potential rapprochement to the Sweden Democrats by
investigating the rhetoric used in relation to immigration in election manifestos from the
Moderates, the Social Democrats, and the Sweden Democrats, and how immigration is
connected with other political issues, which determines the scope of the shifts in immigration
rhetoric. This approach helps answer the three research questions for this project: 1. Has the
rhetoric surrounding migration in the Moderates’, the Social Democrats’, and the Sweden
Democrats’ election manifestos changed 1998-2018? 2. Has the increased focus on migration
impacted other political issues in the parties’ election manifestos? 3. Have mainstream parties
adopted new issues or views which originated with the Sweden Democrats?

Case Selection
I chose Sweden as a case study for three main reasons. First, the upswing in antiimmigration rhetoric since 2015 has been evident in Swedish politics, with several mainstream
parties radically shifting their rhetoric surrounding migration in political speeches, interviews,
and debates.98 This change accentuates a shift in politicians’ view of migration and an increased
acceptance for anti-immigration rhetoric. However, since mainstream parties still openly oppose

98

Hasselberg, “The Limits of Hospitality: The Impact of SD on Immigration Discourses among the
Swedish Political Elite 2006-2016.”

27

the Sweden Democrats, it is important to examine how the shifts in immigration rhetoric impacts
politics more broadly to better understand how the parties relate to one another.
The second reason for choosing Sweden as a case study is that many European countries
have historically had larger right-wing party presence than Sweden.99 In Denmark, for example,
the Danish People’s Party gained ground in the 1990s and has played a crucial role in Danish
politics ever since;100 Austria provides another example, where the Freedom Party of Austria has
gained increased political influence over the years.101 However, scholarly research has
previously shown that right-wing party influence on politics is mixed, and that right-wing parties
have either moved towards the middle once in a position of power or articulated a more moderate
position.102 In Sweden, on the contrary, Sweden Democratic political proposals have been
rearticulated by mainstream parties without the party holding any formal position of power.
Accordingly, the development in Sweden suggests another path for right-wing parties to increase
their influence over national politics, without any formal recognition of their increased power.
By examining Swedish parties’ election manifestos, it is possible to discern to what extent the
Sweden Democrats have been able to influence central political ideas in Swedish politics. Lastly,
the language barrier for examining Swedish election manifestos is minimal, as Swedish is my
first language.
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Sources
My analysis covers election manifestos from the Moderates, the Social Democrats, and
the Sweden Democrats 1998-2018. The selection of these three parties is based on their relative
position in Swedish politics. The Moderates, Social Democrats, and Sweden Democrats are the
three largest parties in the Swedish parliament;103 the Moderates are the largest mainstream right
party, while the Social Democrats are the largest mainstream left party; the Sweden Democrats
are the only right-wing party in Sweden with representation on the national level.104 Previous
studies on voter mobility have also compared these three parties, which also highlights the
important dynamic between them.105 The timeframe 1998-2018 was chosen as it allows me to
examine Swedish Democratic manifestos published after the large reform project in the Sweden
Democratic party to become more respectable in the mid-1990s.106 This timeframe includes
manifestos from the election before immigration was properly politicized in Sweden in 2002,
through the election after the shift in immigration flows in Europe in 2015.107 Lastly, the
Swedish parliament updated one of the four fundamental laws in the Swedish constitution in
1994, which changed the election cycles from three to four years; the new regulation went into
effect January 1, 1995 and the election in 1998 was the first after the change.108 In total, 18
election manifestos are analyzed, six from each party.
Due to the circumstances of Swedish politics, there are some limitations to the source
selection. First, there is no comprehensive record of Swedish election manifestos, and though the
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Swedish National Data Service (SND) provide access to many party manifestos, their collection
of manifestos is incomplete.109 Consequently, other online platforms have been used to find the
election manifestos which are not available through SND.
Another limitation is that the Moderates published joint manifestos with other
mainstream right parties through the Alliance collaboration before the 2006, 2010, and 2014
general elections. Those platforms include propositions which originated with other mainstream
right parties as well as proposals from the Moderates. To parse out which political proposals
originate with the Moderates, I used newspaper commentary to supplement the content analysis
of the 2006-2014 election manifestos. Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, Expressen, and Svenska
Dagbladet, which are four national newspapers, were chosen for the analysis as they have a
nation-wide reader base and are published daily. Thus, the newspapers provide continuous
coverage of the election seasons. Since the Moderates are the largest mainstream party on the
right it is warranted to study the 2006-2014 election manifestos, despite them being published by
the joint right coalition; additionally, three out of the four parties in the Alliance, including the
Moderates, had similar positions on immigration in the 2002 election, which further validates the
use of the joint election manifestos.110
The newspaper articles were gathered through the article search engine Artikelsök and
were collected based on several search criteria.111 I used the general search term “allians”
(Alliance in Swedish) to cast a broad net for articles related to the Alliance. I further established
the time-frame 2005-2015 (i.e. one year before the first, and one year after the last election in
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which the center-right appeared as a joint coalition) to capture the entire discussion of the
parties’ joint proposals. The search was also narrowed to only include full-length newspaper
articles to avoid gathering incomplete data. The search generated 701 results; 141 articles were
published by Aftonbladet, Dagens Nyheter, Expressen, or Svenska Dagbladet and are included in
the analysis. Each article was examined for information about the different parties’ political
positions on specific issues, as well as sources of conflict or consensus within the Alliance.
Another complicating factor is that the parties’ election manifestos are only available in
Swedish, which give rise to many linguistic challenges when translating materials from one
language to another. As language and words are not static, they must be understood within the
societal context which creates and gives meaning to them.112 The election manifestos are
produced to present a party’s political proposals to the voters. This impacts the rhetoric being
used, and “...there will never be one completely fixed meaning of a word and [the] meaning is
always relational.”113 In translating these documents, there is a risk of losing the context, since a
word can mean and symbolize different things in distinct cultural settings, i.e. the Swedish
versus the American context. To balance this ambiguity, I offer additional explanation of some
words when the translation does not fully capture the meaning of the word in the source
language, or there is no appropriate translation. Aside from instances where the essence of
English and Swedish differ, I keep the translation as close to the original as possible.
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Procedure
The examination of election manifestos is conducted in two steps. First, I produce
descriptive statistics for immigration rhetoric in each election manifesto by party; all analyses
were conducted on stemmed language to avoid different grammatical forms of the same word
being counted separately; the terms relating to immigration, which form the basis for the overall
percentage of immigration rhetoric in the election manifestos, are listed in Appendix A. Due to
the substantive focus of the research, each occurrence of these terms was also examined in their
textual context to ensure that the reference to the words occurred in relation to immigration. This
process was particularly important for references to ‘Sweden’ and ‘Swedish’ as these terms often
occurred in other contexts as well; all instances in which the term appeared without relating to
immigration were excluded. Based on results from the word count, I ran several n-gram analyses
(2, 3, 4, and 5-grams). Through the n-grams, it is possible to discover broader trends and patterns
in the data. The word counts produce an overview of the prevalence of immigration rhetoric in
the parties’ election manifestos, while the bigrams make it possible to discern if new verbs or
adjectives were used in combination with immigration rhetoric; the other n-grams show the
context within which immigration was discussed. This gives an initial idea if immigration was
generally discussed in positive or negative terms.
However, since the goal for my research is to track both the changes in immigration
discourse, and the influence of migration rhetoric on other political issues, quantitative measures
are not enough. In the second part of the analysis, I conduct a content analysis of the election
manifestos to understand the connections made between immigration and other political issues.
First, I analyze these connections over time within a party, and then compare the changes among
the parties, across years. This portion of the analysis highlights the political areas which have
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shifted the most over time, and whether immigration rhetoric has become more inclusive or
exclusive. Changes in immigration rhetoric also highlight if the mainstream parties have moved
closer to the Sweden Democrats’ restrictive immigration ideology. The linking between
immigration rhetoric and other political issues emphasizes the more profound impacts of
immigration on parties’ political vision; the content analysis also highlights if there are new
issues introduced by the Sweden Democrats which are then picked up by mainstream parties.
Through this examination, it is possible to infer medium- to long-term political shifts in the
parties’ view of Sweden.

Analysis
The ways in which the Sweden Democrats have impacted immigration rhetoric specifically, and
the political climate more broadly, are presented below. The results from the descriptive
statistical analysis align with findings from previous scholarly research: the frequency of
immigration related language among mainstream parties has increased in recent years;114
however, the percentage of words relating to immigration decreased in the Sweden Democrats’
election manifestos once they entered parliament in 2010. The percental decrease in immigration
rhetoric in later Sweden Democratic manifestos is due to the increase in length of the manifestos,
which included a greater variety of political issues in 2014 and 2018 (see Table 2). Rather than a
decrease in immigration rhetoric, the debate regarding other issues increased, reducing the
percentage of immigration rhetoric in the manifestos (see Figure 2).
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Wordcount per Party and Year
Year
1998
2002
2006
2010
2014
2018
Total

Moderates
1029
1257
2109
2535
3362
2204
12496

Social Democrats
742
821
1016
687
1327
1253
5846

Sweden Democrats
983
287
564
570
1260
1613
5277

Table 2. Total number of unique words in each party’s election manifesto by year.

Figure 2 demonstrates that the percentage of immigration rhetoric has decreased in the
Sweden Democrats’ election manifestos after they entered parliament in 2010, while the
immigration rhetoric in the Moderates’ election manifestos increased post-2010. In the Social
Democrats’ manifestos, there was no increase in immigration rhetoric until 2018, which suggests
that the increased influx of migrants to Europe in 2015 spiked the interest in immigration among
Social Democrats, rather than the Sweden Democrats’ entrance into parliament.115 The increase
in immigration rhetoric in the Alliance’s 2014 election manifesto suggests a departure from
Widfeldt’s finding that mainstream parties decreased the focus on immigration with the rise of
the Sweden Democrats;116 however, the decrease in immigration rhetoric in the Social
Democrats’ manifesto confirms Widfeldt’s conclusion. Though the result for immigration
language in the Social Democrats’ 2014 election manifesto appears to be zero in Figure 2, this is
not the case. The immigration discussion was limited in relation to other topics highlighted and
did, therefore, not yield a significant percentage for the overall manifesto.117 However, the word
immigrant, citizen, racism, segregation, Nordic, and asylum all appeared one time in the 2014
115
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Social Democratic manifesto, while Sweden and Swedish appeared three and two times
respectively. Hence, immigration was highlighted by all three parties 1998-2018, though the
precentral significance of immigration varies significantly between the years.

Figure 2. Aggregate word percentages relating to immigration by party and year. The words included in the graph
are listed in Appendix A.

Despite the difference between the Moderates and the Social Democrats in 2014, when
the Moderates increased the party’s immigration rhetoric while it decreased among Social
Democrats, the two mainstream parties closely follow one another in relation to the amount of
immigration debate in the manifestos. There was a clear increase in immigration rhetoric in
2002, and similarly, both parties recorded the highest level of immigration discourse in 2018. In
2002, more voters listed immigration as an important issue when selecting a party,118 and Dagens
Nyheter reported that it was one of the most prominent questions in the 2002 election.119
Widfeldt also concludes that the Liberals’ increased focus on immigration politicized the
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issue.120 The content analysis of the election manifestos found an increased emphasis on
openness and improved immigration processes in the mainstream parties’ 2002 election
manifestos.121
To further explore how immigration rhetoric has changed since 1998, I ran several ngram analyses. Though there were few recurring phrases within the parties’ manifestos, there are
some trends worth noting.122 In line with what could be expected based on the wordcount, the
number of phrases relating to immigration increased in the Moderates’ election manifesto in
2018; most notably, the phrase “gender, class, and clan”123 occurred as one of the most
frequently used trigrams in the 2018 manifesto and appeared four times, which suggests an effort
to tie these three topics together as main areas of political concern. Additionally, there were
several phrases emphasizing the problems with integration, a framing which did not appear as
frequently in the Moderates’ earlier manifestos. In the Sweden Democrats’ election manifestos,
the opposite was true; there were more references to immigration in the 1998 election manifesto
than in later documents. In the bigram analysis of the Sweden Democrats’ 1998 manifesto, a
common Swedish culture and multiculturalism emerged as prominent themes, but these did not
continue to be significant in later manifestos. Lastly, though it is not as noteworthy as the
development in the Moderate and the Sweden Democratic manifestos, there was some language
in the Social Democrats’ election manifestos which indirectly relates to immigration. In the four-
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gram analysis of the 2006 manifesto, the phrase “Sweden [is] the world’s best country”124
appeared two times, but it is not clear from the n-gram analysis if this phrase appears in relation
to immigration or not. Regardless of the context, it highlights the pride in Sweden as a country,
which forms the foundation for culturally motivated anti-immigration rhetoric.125
Since the occurrence of common phrases in each manifesto is relatively limited, I also
examined all the manifestos for each party together. In these analyses, the bigrams were the only
analysis which generated a significant result relating to immigration.126 The bigram analysis
indicates that the Sweden Democrats emphasized ‘Swedishness’ more than the other parties. The
phrase the “Swedish cultural heritage”127 appeared eight times across the Sweden Democratic
manifestos, and the expression “Swedish culture” or “the Swedish culture” appeared twelve
times.128 The Sweden Democrats also highlighted “foreign citizens,” six times,129 and the phrase
“the Swedish people” and “the Swedish language” both appeared five times.130 The analyses of
Moderate and the Social Democratic manifestos did not generate any significant results related to
immigration. Instead, the parties focused on the economy, education, jobs, and welfare. These
results are expected since immigration only appeared as a prioritized political issue among
mainstream parties in the past few years. Historically, education, jobs, and welfare have been the
most important questions to Swedish voters, and it is not surprising that the mainstream parties
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focused on these issues.131 The Sweden Democrats, on the contrary, emphasized the political
issue which distinguishes the party from mainstream parties, namely immigration.
Because immigration is a recurring topic in all the manifestos, I conduct a content
analysis of the texts to better understand the impact of a shifting immigration discourse and its
relation to changes in other policy areas. I examine both what rhetoric is used in relation to
immigration specifically and assess how immigration is connected to other political issues. In
this examination, I rely on the results from the wordcount analysis and include paragraphs which
contain the words listed in Appendix A, as well as other words which were used in relation to
immigration in the election manifestos, but which were not used frequently enough to generate a
significant percentage (see Appendix B). Together, these lists will capture instances in which the
parties discussed immigration and highlight the relationship between immigration and other
political issues. I also read the entire manifesto to examine if there are new issues introduced in
the mainstream parties’ election manifestos which originated with the Sweden Democrats.
The content analysis of the election manifestos highlights some major trends. Though the
parties emphasized diverse aspects of immigration and tied migration to different political issues
(see Appendix C for a comprehensive list), the topics discussed relating to immigration fall into
six major categories: foreign policy, integration, migration policy, norms, social issues, and
welfare (see Table 3). There is one exception: the Moderates also discussed immigration in
relation to the economy. However, the discussion of immigration economics is not represented in
the analysis, as the Moderates are the only party discussing it (see Appendix C). The
categorization into political themes is somewhat simplified, as many of the political issues fall
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into more than one group. For example, ‘socially and criminally exposed areas’* could be
categorized either in the integration-category or the social issue-category, as exposed areas is one
aspect of the failure to integrate immigrants on the housing market but is also considered a major
social issue.

Political Issues Relating to Immigration
Foreign Policy

Integration

Migration Policy

Norms

Social Issues

Welfare

European Union
(EU)
United Nations
(UN)

Education

Asylum/Refugees

Antisemitism

Crime

Healthcare

Employment

Citizenship

Discrimination

Welfare

Housing

Deportation
Economic selfsufficiency
requirement
Immigration

Honor related
violence etc.
Marriage

Taxes

Language

Culture/Cultural
heritage
Diversity/Multiculturalism
Equality

Extremism

Moral police*

Swedish
values

Labor migration
Migration

Gender equality Organizational
support
Openness
Segregation

Repatriation

Racism

Socially and
Criminally
Exposed areas

Residency Permits Xenophobia
Table 3. Political issues relating to immigration by theme. Issues listed occurred in 2 or more parties’ election
manifestos.

The findings from the content analysis of the manifestos are presented below by party; a
comparison between the parties is presented in the results section.

*

Utanförskapsområden is a commonly used word for describing suburbs to larger cities. The majority of
these neighborhoods were built during the government building boom in the 1950-70s, which was mainly comprised
of high-rise buildings where many immigrants now live. These areas often have less social, educational, and
economic opportunities than other urban areas and the apartments are generally considered being of lower quality.
*
Moralpoliser refers to people who attempt to control what other people, mostly women, in socially and
criminally exposed areas do. These people limit others’ actions based on a specific moral code, often less tolerant
than what is believed to be acceptable based on Swedish norms.
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The Moderates
In 1998, the Moderates highlighted three of the political issues in Table 3: integration,
migration, and welfare. In relation to integration, the Moderates wrote that, “our integration
policies aim to decrease the reliance on government allowances and reduce the time [during
which people receive payments], provide good knowledge in the Swedish language, and require
employment and personal contribution.”132 This sentiment was reiterated in the discussion on
welfare, and the Moderates advocated to “decrease government allowance dependency” and the
period in which immigrants received allowances.133 Lastly, on the topic of migration policy, the
positive aspects of immigration were highlighted: “we want a Sweden which is open to
individuals from other countries and cultures. Diversity is a powerful force in the renewal of our
society. Sweden can benefit from entrepreneurship from other countries and from immigrants
who build bridges to their home countries.”134 Hence, the Moderates’ immigration rhetoric in
1998 was mostly positive, highlighting the possibilities with immigration.
In 2002, the opportunities produced by proper integration were emphasized: “immigrants
who are received well and offered reasonable chances to work and integrate into society can
contribute greatly to development and prosperity.”135 The Moderates wanted “Sweden to remain
a sanctuary for persecuted people who need asylum,”136 a proposal which was reiterated in the
Alliance’s 2010 manifesto.137 However, the Moderates also stressed the issues facing immigrants
in Sweden by stating that it is unacceptable “… that immigrants are shut out from possibilities to
provide for themselves, whether it is due to failed integration policies or employers – public or
132

Moderaterna, “Gör det möjligt för Sverige,” 1998, §19, Svensk Nationell Datatjänst,
https://snd.gu.se/sv/vivill/party/m/manifesto/1998.
133
Moderaterna, §19.
134
Moderaterna, §18.
135
Moderaterna, “Frihet för Sverige,” §186.
136
Moderaterna, §188.
137
Alliansen, “Jobbmanifestet,” August 26, 2010, 31, https://snd.gu.se/sv/vivill/party/m/manifesto/2010.

40

private – which do not hire people other than native Swedes.”138 Education was considered
central to successful integration and the Moderates highlighted the need for a more effective
Swedish education for new Swedes;139 civics and language requirements for citizenship was also
proposed.140
The 2002 welfare debate was, in line with the 1998 manifesto, largely focused on
government allowances; the party argued that immigrants “… deserve a better life than being
dependent on government allowances and [living] in alienation.”141 The Moderates also stated
that they “… do not accept undemanding government allowance dependency… [giving]
immigrants an opportunity to over-exploit the welfare systems.”142 Consequently, in line with
Widfeldt’s finding, the party’s rhetoric was more restrictive in 2002, and highlighted both a
societal and an immigrant responsibility to move from government dependency to providing for
oneself.143 However, immigration was still largely considered an asset to society.144
After the disastrous election in 2002, the Moderates rebranded their party and began the
Alliance collaboration with the other mainstream right parties ahead of the 2006 election.145 The
joint manifesto highlighted the importance of language and employment for proper integration,
and the Alliance wrote that “the best ways to integrate [immigrants] are through employment and
[improved] language skills. We want to improve integration… and counteract discrimination.”146
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The Alliance proclaimed that “Swedish integration policies have failed,”147 and focused on the
societal responsibility to ensure proper integration: “a consistent feature of our integration
policies is to tear down obstacles and to increase opportunities.”148 Media reports around the
2006 election noted that integration was a central issue for the People’s Party/Liberals which
likely impacted the Alliance’s joint position;149 however, these positions are largely in line with
the Moderates’ 2002 proposals, and the party’s disproportionate share of the voters’ support also
impacted its influence on Alliance policy.150
On the issue of migration, the Alliance highlighted the need to upgrade the meaning of
citizenship through the expansion of “citizenship ceremonies.”151 The topic of deportation of
criminal foreign citizens also emerged in 2006, when the Alliance suggested that “in cases of
serious crimes, the main rule should be that foreign citizens get sentenced to deportation.”152
However, the parties also highlighted how “Sweden should be an open society, where
differences and diversity is affirmed…”153 as “the diversity in our country enriches society,
through people with different experiences, origins and cultural and religious identity.”154 Though
the Moderates view largely matched the Alliance’s joint position on migration, the party was
pushed to a slightly more liberal stance through the collaboration with the other right parties,
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who had some more liberal positions on migration.155 However, the rebranding of the party itself
also shifted the Moderates more towards the middle of Swedish politics which also contributed
to more liberal positions.156 After the increased influx in migrants to Europe in 2015, the
Moderates have tried to emphasize a long-standing opposition to liberal migration legislation,
despite the party’s support for liberalizing immigration proposals in previous years.157
The discussion on social issues in relation to immigration in 2006 was dominated by
discrimination. The Alliance parties were concerned about ethnic discrimination both in social
and professional contexts; they stated that “young immigrant guys should feel just as welcome as
others at bars and night clubs,”158 and that “we must vigorously fight ethnic categorization on the
Swedish labor market.”159 The parties also discussed honor related violence and crime among
immigrants: “to fight honor related violence, and support people who are subject to these crimes,
is highly prioritized.”160 Crime in more general terms was also discussed: “though most
immigrants do not commit crime, the proportion of criminals among foreign born people is twice
as high as among the domestically born population. This is a social problem which needs to be
taken more seriously… the main course to fight criminality is always to obviate social
causes.”161 In relation to welfare, the language softened compared to previous manifestos; the
parties wrote that “there is no need for more control or lower government allowances for
immigrants specifically, but rather a politics which liberates people’s inherent power.”162
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After four years of government collaboration, the 2010 Alliance election manifesto
highlighted both the integration achievements during the Alliance’s time in power, and the
remaining problems. The parties contended that “new influences have enriched Sweden
culturally, economically, and knowledge wise through all times. Simultaneously, large
deficiencies remain in the systems to integrate immigrants into society... [resulting in] high
unemployment rates and social issues in city suburbs. We also see [issues] with poor educational
results [among immigrants] and discrimination on the labor market.”163 The importance of
education for better integration was specifically highlighted, as it would help immigrants get
established on the labor market and ease integration, among other things.164 The parties
reinforced the importance of getting a job, learning Swedish, and added the significance of
“learning how society works;”165 this is the first instance in which societal values are included in
the integration project. The focus on employment aligns with the Alliances broader emphasis on
employment and the economy, which were main issues for the Moderates, especially after the
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009.166 Ahead of the 2010 election, the Alliance collaboration had
solidified, and the parties’ joint position meant more for their success than either party’s
individual position.167
The Alliance’s discussion on welfare focused on equal access: “opportunities to get good
health care in time should not be dependent upon if you are a man or a woman, young or old,
native or immigrant to Sweden, have a higher or lower education level or income, or where in
163
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the country you live.”168 The parties also advocated for an open society, and the Alliance
described Sweden as a “…country with a tradition of openness towards the world.”169 The
parties attested to “the equal worth of all people…”170 and argued that “background, ethnicity, or
race should not decide which choices you make or what you can do in life.”171 In regard to
citizenship, the Alliance highlighted both its practical and symbolic value and the rights and
obligations connected to it.172 The positive tone surrounding immigration was, thus, solidified in
the 2010 election manifesto, highlighting the opportunities with immigration and a diverse
society.
The 2014 election is the last to date in which the Alliance presented a joint manifesto.
Foreign policy emerged as a new topic relating to immigration, and the Alliance-parties
articulated that “… more legal ways into the EU are needed. Sweden is taking a great
responsibility for the European refugee reception and we think that more EU countries should
take a greater responsibility…”173 The Alliance also stated that, “… Sweden should continue to
be a country which takes responsibility for the most exposed people. Sweden, and other
European countries can do that, despite recession and internal challenges;”174 these statements
are similar to the positions the Moderates had articulated in previous years.175 The Alliance
defended “… a welcoming society which is characterized by respect, tolerance, and
openness,”176 also highlighting that “all people should take part in our society, regardless of
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religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or gender.”177 This position is in line with the migration
agreement the Alliance reached with the Green Party in 2011 regarding more liberal refugee and
family reunification policies.178
The problems of integrating immigrants were also discussed in 2014, but the Alliance
highlighted the improvements it had made to Swedish integration, “with a focus on employment
and language for a quicker introduction to society… [however,] it still takes too long for newly
arrived immigrants to get a job and we need to get better at cultivating the competence people
bring to Sweden.”179 A main focus in the education debate was language acquisition and
education as a complement to employment; the Alliance wanted “foreign grades and merits to be
validated faster”180 while stressing the need for youth and newly arrived immigrants to learn
Swedish.181
In relation to norms, extremism emerged as a new topic in the 2014 manifesto, and the
Alliance parties stated that “violent extremism must… be met with preventative measures and
defector programs. To counteract recruitment to anti-democratic movements, and radicalization
are prioritized issues.”182 This new extremist trend was also noted as an emerging social issue:
“we can never accept a development where the family, gangs, or other groups take on the
public’s responsibility and appoints justice or places blame.”183 The parties wanted “… to uplift
‘socially and criminally exposed areas’ and ensure that new Swedes have the opportunity to
grow through their own power.”184 In 2014, the Alliance highlighted the issues with immigrant
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dependency on government allowances and the improvements the parties had made to the
system: “the ‘omhändertagandementalitet’* … has been broken and a person who comes to
Sweden now encounters the question of what they can contribute with rather than which grant
system they should be in.”185 But the parties also emphasized immigrants’ positive impact on
welfare: “a commonality for all of them is that they contribute to our common welfare…”186
Though the parties in the Alliance pointed to some issues with integration in 2014, the general
view of migration remained positive, and the parties considered immigration a societal asset.187
In 2018, the Moderates presented their own election manifesto after three elections of
Alliance collaboration. The party continued to highlight the need to be open towards the world,
but posited openness against Sweden’s national interest: “it is natural to affirm openness towards
the world––and, at the same time, safeguard Sweden’s national interests through regulated
migration.”188 The party also maintained that “…migration policies must be developed with
regard to the great refugee reception we have had, and the extensive integration problems we
face. Due to this, Sweden must receive fewer asylum seekers and have a permanently strict
asylum legislation… Rules and regulations should be developed to align with our neighboring
countries.”189 The Moderates also called for a common refugee system in the EU, since Sweden
had taken a disproportionate responsibility for refugees in the union.190 These proposals are more
restrictive compared to previous manifestos, likely due to the shift in migration flows to Sweden
in 2015 and 2016.
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The previous focus on employment for proper integration was downgraded, and Swedish
values appeared as a central aspect of the integration project. The Moderates wrote that
“integration is about more than employment and economic self-sufficiency. It’s also about values
and community. In Sweden freedom, laws, and ‘arbetslinjen’* applies equally to all––and is not
to be limited by ‘gender, class, or clan.’*”191 The Moderates also suggested that decreasing the
number of immigrants would ease integration, transferring the ownership of integration issues
from society to immigrants.192 The party remained optimistic, however, and concluded that “it
will not be easy [to tackle the integration issues]… But the problems can be solved.”193
The focus on language acquisition in previous manifestos continued in 2018, but the
language of opportunity shifted to one of obligation.194 To avoid that asylum seekers became
passive members of society, the Moderates advocated for “… a stronger focus on the Swedish
language, employment, and education from day one.”195 The party also wanted to “increase
education and … introduce civics test for all newly arrived people.”196 The Moderates continued
to emphasize the need for a higher symbolic status for Swedish citizenship, in combination with
stricter citizenship requirements; the party proposed tests for knowledge in Swedish and civics to
attain citizenship and also wanted to increase the residency requirement for citizenship from five
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to seven years. The Moderates moreover endorsed revoking citizenship for foreign citizens who
committed serious crimes or provided incorrect information on the citizenship application.197
The rhetoric on social problems in relation to immigration was intensified in 2018: “the
development towards cruder gang criminality… places new demands on the judicial system.”198
The Moderates also highlighted the issue with “a growing underground society* where people
whose asylum request has been rejected continue to live and work;”199 later in the manifesto, the
party stated: “if we do not stop this development, it will lead to a permanent underground society
dominated by exposure, exploitation, and criminality.”200 The Moderates supported the
deportation of foreign born criminals,201 and advocated for temporary rather than permanent
residency permits. The party also proposed stricter requirements for receiving a residency permit,
including an economic self-sufficiency requirement for family reunification.202 The need for
more illegal immigrants to repatriate or get deported was moreover highlighted, an issue which
previous manifestos did not discuss.203 The Moderates also advocated for an “increase [in] the
number of implemented deportations and internal immigration controls.”204
Discussions on norms focused on Swedish equality norms in opposition to other norms.
The first paragraph of the Moderate manifesto states that “here [in Sweden] we believe in
equality between men and women and in tolerance and respect for different life choices,”
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presupposing a ‘there’ where equality is not valued.205 The three categories ‘gender, class, and
clan’ were also regularly referenced, in opposition to equality and rights, which indicates these as
markers constraining Swedish society;206 clan was introduced as a new parameter in the 2018
election while gender and class had been referenced in previous manifestos as well. Inequality
was also highlighted as a specific issue among immigrant groups: “the view of equality in some
immigrant groups… is different from the norms and values which characterizes Swedish
society,” suggesting that immigrants increase inequality in Sweden.207
The idea that immigrant groups have distinctive norms was also evident in the
Moderates’ discussion on extremism: “there has previously been a compliancy towards some
individuals and groups which do not accept values of equality, individual freedom and rights,
and religious freedom which to us are obvious. This must end.”208 Though this excerpt does not
specifically mention immigrants, the reference to religious intolerance is a common marker to
refer to organizations connected to Islam. Hence, anti-immigrant rhetoric is articulated through
an opposition to Islam, as highlighted by Minkenberg and others.209 These sentiments ties into
the Moderates’ discussion on honor related issues: “violence in close relationships is a serious
societal problem, as is honor related violence and honor oppression.”210 In order to fight honor
related oppression the party suggested “stricter punishment for honor crimes through the
introduction of a specific offense,” and to “criminalize the so called moral police who limit
women’s everyday lives.”211
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The 2018 discussion on welfare positioned generous immigration in opposition to welfare
expenditures, which is a new position for the Moderates; the party wrote: “the expenses [for
immigration] are… large for the national and local government. Money which could go to the
welfare system’s core is instead used for different forms of government allowances.”212 By tying
access to welfare to work or permanent legal residency in Sweden,213 the party suggested
limiting immigrants’ access to welfare:
By living in Sweden, one gets… access to the rights of a welfare state. This
means that newly arrived people immediately get access to most of these
[systems], without working or paying taxes. This [scheme] risks minimizing the
motivations to work, and at the same time questions the legitimacy of the Swedish
allowance system… People who come to Sweden should therefore gradually get
access to different allowances and social compensation…214
The examination of the Moderate election manifestos illustrates that the party’s position
on migration in 2018 was more restrictive than in previous manifestos. A few examples of these
shifts are that, the Alliance wanted EU to implement more generous immigration policies in
2014, while the Moderates preferred to realign Sweden’s immigration politics with more
restrictive policies in other EU countries in 2018. Integration policies were consistently
highlighted by the Moderates, and all manifestos focused on language and employment to
improve integration. However, the Moderates’ rhetoric surrounding integration shifted from
centering on society’s role in 2006 and 2010, to focusing on what is expected of immigrants to
integrate in 2018. Additionally, the Moderates emphasized the importance of Swedish norms for
integration in 2018, a topic which had only been briefly mentioned before. The connection
between immigration and welfare was also consistent in the Moderate election manifestos, but
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not until 2018 did the party articulate a conflict between immigration and generous welfare
policies.

The Social Democrats
Between the end of the Second World War and 2006, the Social Democrats governed
almost uninterrupted––the center-right only managed to win two general elections during that
time period.215 Accordingly, the Social Democrats have had a profound impact on the
development of Swedish politics. The 1998 election followed four years of Social Democratic
rule, and the party’s manifesto focused on high unemployment rates, and suggested the
introduction of “measures… which increase the employment frequency, which… ensure elders’
and immigrants’ place in working life.”216 The party also called for “… a society where all
people can develop and influence their own living situation, … where men and women have the
same rights, despite ethnic or cultural background...;”217 the Social Democrats moreover wanted
to “… leave intolerance, racism, and egoism in the 20th century.”218 In relation to health care, the
Social Democrats wanted to “improve the quality of health care––especially in ‘socially and
criminally exposed areas.’”219 The 1998 manifesto also proposed “… special resources [to
increase employment in]… the worst affected areas: in rural areas and in cities ‘socially and
criminally exposed areas;’”220 a point which was reiterated in 2006.221
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In 2002, the Social Democrats expanded their discussion relating to immigration by
including foreign policy as an issue tied to migration. The party “… wanted to develop a
common refugee system within the EU, which is dominated by humanitarianism, openness and
responsibility;”222 this position was reaffirmed in 2014.223 The Social Democrats also stressed
the importance of a humane, solidary, and judicially fair* refugee reception,224 and that “the rule
of law for asylum seekers must get better and the turnaround times in the refugee process
shorter.”225 The discourse was also dominated by migrant rights: “the right to the Swedish
language” was highlighted, and the Social Democrats wrote that “language is crucial to entering
working life and standing strong as a parent.”226 The manifesto also highlighted the Social
Democrats’ intent to support immigrant children in reaching the course requirements in
school.227 The party noted that “segregation must be broken – in the labor market, education, and
housing – and discrimination must be pushed back.”228 In relation to norms, the Social
Democrats stated that “xenophobia and racism must be combated,”229 and that “diversity is an
asset we should defend.”230 Immigration was thus discussed mainly in positive terms,
highlighting how to improve life for immigrants.
In 2006, the election was dominated by employment issues, which also impacted the
discussion on immigration.231 The Social Democrats wrote that “the basis for integration is
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employment for adults and a good education for children…”232 and suggested improved Swedish
education for immigrants and additional support for immigrant children in school.233 Moreover,
the party continued to combat discrimination, and contended that “all discrimination is
unacceptable – regardless if it is due to gender, ethnicity, disabilities, sexual orientation, religion,
or age.”234 In line with discussions in 2002, the Social Democrats stressed the importance of a
humane and fair refugee reception,235 and also advocated that “any person who is in need of
protection should get a safe haven in our country;”236 the call for these provisions continued in
2014 with almost identical phrasing.237 In relation to welfare, the Social Democrats encouraged
“special investments in elder care in many languages,” but did not directly reference
immigrants.238
The 2010 election followed four years of Alliance rule and occurred in a political climate
dominated by the financial crisis. Employment in relation to integration continued to be at the
center of Swedish politics; the Social Democrats proposed that “more newly arrived people…
should get established on the labor market.”239 Though the Social Democrats acknowledged that
“fear is increasing and with that xenophobia,”240 the party “… wanted Sweden to be a country of
opportunity for all, where each and every one – despite background – gets the chance to realize
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their dreams.”241 However, the discussion on immigration in 2010 was limited, and the manifesto
was focused on other political issues.
In 2014, after eight years of Alliance rule, the Social Democrats highlighted issues which
had occurred during the party’s time in opposition; the party argued that with Social Democratic
politics “divisions which pull Sweden apart will decrease, between men and women, urban areas
and rural areas, Swedish born and immigrant, rich and poor, and young and old.”242
Discriminating structures were also highlighted, and the Social Democrats wanted to fight
“ethnic discrimination and the discrimination of people with disabilities in working life.”243 The
Social Democrats’ major focus in the immigration debate was on equalizing policies which
improve life for all people.
The Social Democrats and the Green Party formed a government after the 2014 election,
and the Social Democrats ran for re-election in 2018. The 2018 election was the first after the
increased influx of migrants to Europe in 2015, and the importance of immigration as a political
issue was amplified.244 Because of the centrality of the EU for immigration related issues, the
Social Democrats called for a common refugee system in the union in 2018;245 but while the
party “… defend[ed] the right to seek asylum,” it stated that, “[Sweden cannot take] a
disproportionate amount of responsibility for refugee reception… but the responsibility must be
held in common.”246 The party proposed to “keep the new [stricter] asylum legislation until
common regulations in the EU are in place which means that fewer asylum seekers come to
Sweden and more to other countries.”247 The Social Democrats also wanted to “… expand the
241
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UN international ratio refugee system so that the responsibility is dispersed among more
countries,” and also suggested to “give strong support to UNHCR’s [United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees] work to help refugees in the conflict vicinity…”248 The above
proposals are the first in any Social Democratic election manifesto which openly discuss limiting
migration to Sweden, though the party has opposed labor immigration in the past.249 In 2018, the
party suggested “limiting labor migration so that jobs with low educational requirements, where
there are no labor shortages, are given to unemployed people in Sweden.”250 The Social
Democrats also wanted to “ensure that a denial of an asylum application also results in the
person… leaving the country.”251
The debate on discrimination also changed in 2018, and the Social Democrats focused on
the issue of moral police in immigrant dense areas, rather than the discrimination of immigrants
which had been noted in previous years; the party stated that it can “never tolerate that
neighborhoods are restrained by self-appointed moral police.”252 This example highlights a shift
from focusing on discrimination in society writ large, to emphasizing suppressive structures
among immigrants. The 2018 election manifesto also highlighted the societal expectations on
immigrants: “there are no shortcuts – the adult, able-bodied person who wants to be a part of
Swedish society must work and speak Swedish.”253 The Social Democrats also proposed
language requirements and mandatory language training for asylum seekers and people living on
government allowances who need to learn Swedish to get a job;254 these proposals imply that the
party does not believe enough immigrants work. Housing was also considered a major
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integration issue: “overcrowding and unsafe neighborhoods limit … people’s opportunity to get a
job, learn Swedish and live their own life;”255 the party wanted to limit immigrants’ opportunities
to choose their own housing to hinder too many immigrants from moving to the same
neighborhood.256
Though the Social Democrats only proposed one concrete policy change, in relation to
the EU, the 2018 election manifesto points to a shift in focus. In 2002 and 2014, discussions
relating to the EU were focused on a more solidary refugee reception, whereas the party started
promoting more restrictive measures in the 2018 election manifesto. The emphasis also shifted
from generous migration measures and the opportunities immigration brings, to stressing the
need for stricter migration policies and the issues which arise with immigration. Despite the calls
for stricter immigration legislation, the Social Democrats described Sweden as “… one of the
most liberal countries in the world…,”257 confirming Hasselberg’s conclusion that it is important
for mainstream parties to appear tolerant, even if they propose stricter immigration policies.258
The general trend in the Social Democrats’ manifestos is that the former highlight opportunities
while the 2018 manifesto emphasizes issues facing Sweden. Another recurring theme in the
manifestos was welfare, but this issue was only connected to immigration in two instances, both
highlighting the need to improve welfare services for the immigrant population. This suggests
that the Social Democrats’ positive position on welfare results in less discussion of unfair use of
the welfare system which has dominated the debate on welfare and immigration among other
parties. One clear distinction between 2018 and previous manifestos is that the 2018 manifesto
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focused more on solving perceived integration problems rather than creating opportunity for
immigrants.

The Sweden Democrats
The Sweden Democrats’ political project is based in the party’s strong opposition to
immigration and a critique of mainstream parties’ inability to tackle integration issues.
Consequently, immigration has been central to all Sweden Democratic election manifestos. The
1998 manifesto highlighted that “…criminality and unemployment among immigrants”259 is a
significant cost for society; the party estimated that “between 80 and 90 % of street crime in
cities are committed by immigrant youth.”260 The Sweden Democrats also wrote that “due to the
fact that the entry control into the country has been below all criticism, many terrorist
organizations have chosen to establish bases in Sweden.”261 Another theme discussed in the 1998
manifesto was multiculturalism as a threat to democracy: “in Sweden we want to preserve
democracy. Therefore, we consider a multicultural society an impossibility.”262 Immigration was
also highlighted as a threat to the Swedish culture, and the Sweden Democrats suggested that “a
repatriation system to safe home countries for non-Western immigrants is needed to ensure our
cultural survival.”263
The 2002 election manifesto covered a broad range of issues which were tied to
immigration. Specific social issues were not articulated in relation to immigration in 2002, but
the Sweden Democrats contended more broadly that “Sweden has received too many immigrants
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in too short a time. This has resulted in grave economic and social issues.”264 The general
sentiment that Sweden has received too many immigrants also informed the remainder of the
party’s political positions. The Sweden Democrats argued for more employer freedom when
hiring personnel, and “employers should not be forced to hire someone because of their gender
or ethnicity.”265 The party also wanted to increase repatriation efforts: “foreigners without the
need for protection and the opportunity to provide for themselves should return to their home
countries.”266
The Sweden Democrats also emphasized the connection between a strong Swedish
identity and a sense of societal security: “it is natural to be proud of one’s country, and the
heritage from previous generations is worth preserving. If people feel secure in their own
identity, society too can be secure and harmonious.”267 Relatedly, the Swedish language’s
importance was discussed, and the party claimed that “the Swedish language’s position must be
defended.”268 Another issue discussed in the 2002 election manifesto was citizenship: “a basic
requirement should be long-term, permanent residency in Sweden and mastering the Swedish
language both verbally and in writing, and that one has absorbed the Swedish culture.”269
In the 2006 election, the Sweden Democrats stressed the importance of international
collaboration. Since the party advocated to leave the EU until early 2019, the main focus was on
promoting collaboration in the United Nations.270 The party suggested deepening interstate
collaboration on several issues, including conflict resolution and refugee aid.271 As for Swedish
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migration policies, the Sweden Democrats wanted to “stop mass-immigration and return to a
responsible migration politics where immigration is limited to a level which is not higher than
our neighboring countries.”272 The party also stated that “temporary, not permanent, residency
permits should be the rule.”273
Stricter requirements for immigrants in Sweden were also proposed; the party suggested
“dismantling tax financed native language education,”274 a proposition which was reiterated in
both 2010 and 2014.275 Additionally, the Sweden Democrats advocated for “returning to the
assimilation politics in place in the middle of the 1970s, which meant that the immigrant should
conform to Swedish society, not the other way around.”276 The party claimed that “the
irresponsible and undemanding Swedish integration- and immigration politics have … resulted
in segregation, uprooting, criminality, and increased conflict.”277 The generous migration
legislation was specifically a problem since “… only a fraction [of the immigrants] had been
refugees. This has resulted in immense economic, social and cultural problems in our country,
and has, simultaneously, decreased our capacity to improve support to truly distressed people
around the world.”278 Gender relations was also considered an issue, and the party stated that
“the arrangement of forced marriages, which are common among certain immigrant groups,
should be counteracted and punished.”279
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To ensure that more immigrants voluntarily left Sweden, the party proposed to “increase
the repatriation grants and encourage foreigners… to return to their home countries.”280 To
become a citizen, stricter requirements were also advised. In addition to permanent residency,
and linguistic and cultural assimilation,281 the party added that citizenship applicants also needed
to be “law-abiding” to acquire citizenship.282 Assimilation was considered necessary, as
“multiculturalism and the lack of respect for the Swedish cultural heritage have undermined the
Swedish identity and the community in our society.”283 Welfare in relation to immigration was
also discussed in 2006, and the Sweden Democrats highlighted the unfair treatment of Swedish
retirees: “no Swedish retiree should have a monthly income which is lower than the elder support
the government bestow upon elder immigrants.”284 The party also contended that “no political
party can credibly talk about improved public services or lower taxes… without first accounting
for how immigration expenses should decrease.”285 Thus, decreasing immigration was central to
the Sweden Democrats’ funding of the welfare system.
The 2010 election manifesto highlighted a range of immigration related issues. The
Sweden Democrats recommended to “… introduce Swedish as the only approved
communication language in schools,”286 to ensure its dominant role in society. The party also
argued that they wanted a Sweden in which “… citizens feel a cultural affinity, and thereby a
natural trust to other citizens, the judicial system, and the legislature.”287 Additionally, the
Sweden Democrats wanted “increased support to women who live under religious or honor
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related oppression in Sweden.”288 In regard to welfare, the party proposed changing the access to
healthcare for immigrants. The party wanted to “abolish the free health- and dental-care for
illegal immigrants,”289 and also suggested “the introduction of mandatory health inspections for
newly arrived immigrants.”290 The 2010 election manifesto also proposed to “… increase the
support for the millions of the world’s distressed refugees through an increase in support to …
UNHCR.”291 The party further wanted to “… stop the Islamization of Swedish society,”292 and
introduce a “ban against wearing hijab in public places.”293
In 2014, the Sweden Democrats continued to push for more interstate collaboration on
several issues, and to increase the support to UNHCR.294 In addition to these, previously
articulated claims, the party also wanted to “… increase the number of ratio refugees among the
asylum seekers which are granted residency permits…” in Sweden.295 The Sweden Democrats
further proposed that switching from refugee reception to helping migrants in the conflict
vicinity would benefit both Swedes and refugees as it would “…free funds for Swedish welfare
and, simultaneously, be just as helpful to the world’s poor people and refugees…”296
The Sweden Democrats also suggested a “…limitation to asylum- and family
reunification-migration”297 to decrease the number of immigrants in Sweden. Additionally, the
party defended the current Swedish labor legislation by proposing to decrease the time foreign
workers could be stationed in Sweden.298 The party also wanted to abolish general labor
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migration,299 and create “a Sweden where immigration politics are shaped in a responsible way
[making] immigration an asset, not a strain, to society.”300 The Sweden Democrats moreover
proposed stricter controls to hinder any “… exploitation of the welfare systems,”301 and “…
making agreements with other countries to be able to deport people” from Sweden.302 A proposal
for “an increase in punishment, and increased efforts against genital mutilation, forced
marriages, and sexual and honor related violence”303 was also advised.
Previous assimilationist mandates were rearticulated through the party’s opposition to
native language education. The 2014 proposal moved the responsibility for native language
education to the localities rather than the national government, and the Sweden Democrats
proposed to “… abolish the legal mandate for localities to offer native language education.”304
The Sweden Democrats also suggested to “eliminate all national integration policies with the
exception of Swedish education, mandatory civics, and the validation of professional
experience…” to not provide more support to immigrants than native Swedes.305 Moreover, the
party lifted the importance of “increased knowledge about the Swedish language and increased
knowledge, understanding and respect for the Swedish cultural heritage” for immigrants to
successfully integrate into society.306
The party’s cultural pride was also highlighted in 2014: “we are proud of our culture, our
traditions, and our beautiful cultural sites.”307 The Sweden Democrats also reiterated their
preference for “a country with a strong inner cohesion and solidarity, build on a common
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identity.”308 The party promoted a society “… which is open towards the world but which,
simultaneously, safeguard our common community and our own unique culture and identity.”309
The Sweden Democrats restated their proposal to increase the status of citizenship through the
“… introduction of language and civic tests” and to increase the length of the residency
requirement.310
In 2014, the Sweden Democrats also proposed to abolish free health- and dental-care for
immigrants,311 as the party wanted “a Sweden in which the law-abiding, resident population is
not discriminated against within the healthcare system in relation to foreign citizens who are
residing illegally in the country;”312 the party also proposed mandatory health inspections for
immigrants to “… quickly treat sick people and effectively protect Swedish society from the
spreading of contagious disease…”313 Additionally, the party wanted to “limit newly-arrived
immigrants’… access to the welfare system during their first year in the country.”314
In 2018, the Sweden Democrats expanded the repatriation argument315 by proposing to
“… invest in the reconstruction [of former conflict areas] and give generous support for people
who voluntary repatriate.”316 Accordingly, the Sweden Democrats’ foreign policy position
remained stable between 1998-2018. The focus on repatriation is central to the party, as “a very
high level of asylum- and family-reception has… hollowed out the welfare system;”317 a
common identity “… is particularly important in a society with a solidary funded welfare-model,
as the solidarity which builds the system is reliant on a common identity and a strong sense of
308
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community.”318 Hence, immigration and multiculturalism stand in opposition to a wellfunctioning welfare state.
The Sweden Democrats described Sweden as “… a divided country, divided between
immigrants and Swedes, urban and rural areas, [and] older and younger people.”319 The party
also worried about growing antisemitism in Sweden: “Jews flee Swedish cities while
antisemitism is growing stronger.” Though the statement on antisemitism is not directly tied to
immigration, it is expressed in the context of a dysfunctional immigration system, which
suggests that immigrants are anti-Semitic. The party urged Swedes to “… congregate around
common norms and values, collective memories, common myths, holidays, traditions, customs
and practices to stick together.”320 The Sweden Democrats, furthermore, wanted to “fortify the
cultural affinity through local cultural guides with the task of collecting, marketing, and
integrating the local cultural heritage into welfare operations, and establish Sweden Centers in
the country’s most ‘socially and criminally exposed areas.’”321
The ‘socially and criminally exposed areas’ were also connected to crime: “the number of
unsafe and ‘socially and criminally exposed areas’ in Sweden increases, the neighborhoods
become more and more overcrowded and segregation is spreading.”322 The party stated that
“women, children and elders are hesitant to go outside by themselves at night, while brutal civil
wars are fought between rivaling gangs.”323 The party also noted that “honor related violence and
oppression has been established as a phenomenon and many young girls are limited daily
regarding association, clothes, and activities.”324 To battle this development, the party suggested
318
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“… a special offense for honor related crimes, instituting a 24-year age rule for marriages
between foreign citizens, banning gender segregation in public functions, and improving health
care for genital mutilated people, and banning non-medical circumcision of minors.”325
To properly integrate immigrants, education is central, and the party wanted to “ensure
that immigrant children and youth do not get thrown into the Swedish education system before
they are ready through the implementation of special preparation schools.”326 The Sweden
Democrats also wanted to “fight the underground society by giving the police tools and resources
to search for people who are residing in the country illegally, and increase the number of holding
facilities and make it possible for longer stays…” at those facilities if deportation is not
immediately possible.327 To limit the number of immigrants arriving in Sweden, the Sweden
Democrats proposed to restrict immigration by “…only receiving asylum seekers from our
neighboring countries and to stop all asylum reception as long as Sweden’s vicinity is safe.”328
The latter proposal highlight how the Sweden Democrats moved even further toward restricting
immigration policies when other parties adopted the party’s original position. The Sweden
Democrats also promoted an expansion of “…the civics education offered to immigrants, …
making it mandatory to obtain residency permits,”329 and revoking residency permits if the basis
for granting them changed.330
Lastly in 2018, the Sweden Democrats emphasized the spirit of citizenship: “Swedish
citizens understand both his/her obligations and responsibilities, and his/her rights,” and, by
extension, “… show their willingness to take on the collective responsibility for Sweden.”331 The
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right to access welfare should be linked more clearly to citizenship, thus increasing the meaning
of being a citizen.332 Additionally, the abolishing of free health and dental care for immigrants
was proposed,333 and immigrants were seen as a main reason for the problems with housing
shortages.334 Consequently, the discussion on immigration in the 2018 manifesto focused on
several distinct political issues, with the main focus of immigrants respecting and adapting to
Swedish society.
The above review highlights that immigration is a dominating and constant issue in the
Sweden Democratic election manifestos. The party has focused on several distinct political
issues, but continuously emphasized the need to limit migration and the importance of
immigrants assimilating to Swedish society. The position on immigration has been largely
consistent 1998-2018, though some proposals on immigration has become more restrictive while
others are less emphasized. The outline of the manifestos has also changed, and the Sweden
Democrats have introduced a wider array of political issues which are not dominated by
immigration. This change highlights how the party has shifted from talking almost solely about
immigration to addressing other political issues as well. This suggests that the Sweden
Democrats are moving away from exclusively focusing on immigration, to emphasizing other
political issues as well to gain ground among new voter groups.

Results of Findings
The examination of the Moderates’, the Social Democrats’ and the Sweden Democrats’
1998-2018 election manifestos suggests both significant differences and similarities between the
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parties. It also highlights the ways in which Swedish parties are discussing immigration in
relation to other political issues, and the broader influence the Sweden Democrats have had on
Swedish politics. My broader perspective on immigration rhetoric distinguishes my research
from previous examinations. As a result, my findings trace rhetorical changes on immigration as
well as other political issues, which increases the significance of the Sweden Democrats’ impact
on Swedish politics.

Differences Between the Parties
Historically, there have been clear differences between the Moderates, the Social
Democrats, and the Sweden Democrats on policy issues relating to immigration. The Moderates
and the Social Democrats have focused on the positive aspects of migration and society’s
obligation to properly integrate newly arrived people. More specifically, the Moderates have
articulated a positive view of labor migration and argued that migration enriches Swedish society
and the welfare system. The Social Democrats have also had a positive view of migration, but
have more actively defended Swedish labor laws, which make them more reserved when it
comes to labor migration. However, the party has remained a strong advocate for liberal
migration policies in relation to refugees and emphasized how cultural diversity enriches
society.335
The Sweden Democrats, on the contrary, articulate a long-standing opposition to
immigration and present an alternative to the liberal migration policies proposed by mainstream
parties. This opposition is rooted in both an ideological and practical opposition to immigration;
the Sweden Democrats see immigration as both a threat to Swedish cultural survival and a strain
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on the welfare system. The ideological opposition to immigration has historically differentiated
the Sweden Democrats from the two mainstream parties who have only emphasized the practical
issues with immigration. The distinction between ideology and practice became somewhat
blurred in the 2018 Moderate election manifesto, which highlights the opposition between
Swedish and immigrant norms and the need for immigrants to adopt Swedish values to integrate
in society.
There is also a difference between how the Moderates and the Social Democrats have
reacted to the rise of the Sweden Democrats and the shift in migration flows in Europe. In the
Social Democratic election manifestos, the emphasis continued to be mainly practical, and
focused on education, employment and language to better integrate immigrants into society. In
the Moderates’ 2018 election manifesto, the party emphasized the need for immigrants to adopt
Swedish norms and values to integrate into society, which marks a shift in focus. This is a step
away from previous mainstream parties’ position on immigration which emphasized the
importance of physical, not cultural, integration. The shift in the 2018 election manifesto moves
the Moderates closer to the Sweden Democrats’ assimilationist position.

Similarities Between the Parties
As the previous section notes, the parties had significantly different positions on issues
relating to immigration 1998-2014. However, in 2018 a shift occurred, and the mainstream
parties’ positions on immigration related issues moved closer together. Both the Moderates and
the Social Democrats shifted their rhetoric to focusing on challenges facing Swedish society due
to immigration and the need to decrease immigration to solve those issues. This is in line with
the longstanding Sweden Democratic argument that immigration is a threat to Swedish society,
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and some of the party’s language has been directly transferred to the mainstream parties. The
Social Democrats, for example, proposed to focus economic support to refugees in the conflict
vicinity, a proposal which the Sweden Democrats articulated in both 2010 and 2014.336 The
Moderates have also adopted policy proposals from the Sweden Democrats, and the party shifted
from a position highlighting opportunities for the welfare state with increased immigration to
emphasizing the conflict between immigration and the welfare state.337 The Moderates also
adopted the Sweden Democrats’ proposal to deport immigrants who commit crime.338
In 2018, there was also an increased emphasis on requirements and/or obligations for
immigrants in Sweden. Previous Moderate and Social Democratic manifestos had highlighted
how to best integrate immigrants into society, but in 2018 the parties shifted from placing the
burden of integration on society to assigning it to the immigrants. The migrants’ obligation to
fulfill economic, linguistic, and educational requirements was highlighted,339 policies which the
Sweden Democrats have driven for many years. Hence, the focus among mainstream parties has
shifted from society’s obligation to integrate newly arrived people, to migrants’ responsibility to
adapt to Swedish society.

Significance
The significance of this study is twofold. First, my research adds new data to the study of
immigration rhetoric among Swedish parties. Recent investigations at Lund University show that
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the parties generally deliver on their election promises, and it is, therefore, important to examine
how these promises change over time.340 Secondly, this study looks at both immigration rhetoric,
and its impact on other political issues. This is significant as it underscores the interrelatedness of
political issues by highlighting how changes in one policy area can impact other areas of public
policy. The fact that mainstream parties have aligned their proposals with the Sweden Democrats
on several immigration related issues, thus decreasing the gap between the parties, is particularly
significant in relation to mainstream parties’ continuous opposition to the Sweden Democrats.

Limitations and Future Research
A main limitation of this study is the lack of previous research on the topic, which
decreases the resources available for comparison; accordingly, it was not possible to determine if
the study could render significant results until after the analysis was completed. Additionally,
since the study only includes a single case, more research is needed to draw international
conclusions on the impact of anti-immigration rhetoric on political policies. Although the results
are significant for Swedish politics, it is not possible to extrapolate any conclusions to other
countries. Future research should expand the study to additional countries to infer the
international impact of right-wing party rhetoric. Studies comparing the Swedish case with other
European countries are especially beneficial, due to the similarity between Sweden and other
cases in Europe. An expansion of the study to include all Swedish parties would add additional
relevance to the case as it would capture both the dominant immigration narrative, and potential
counter narratives.
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Conclusion
I set out to examine how the Moderates’, the Social Democrats’, and the Sweden
Democrats’ immigration rhetoric has changed between 1998-2018, and if such a shift has
impacted mainstream parties’ position on other political issues. Ultimately, such changes would
highlight whether the Sweden Democrats have been able to introduce new issues or views to the
mainstream parties’ political agenda. The election manifestos show a clear shift in both the
Moderates’ and the Social Democrats’ immigration rhetoric. However, this shift did not occur
until 2018, which is in line with Hasselberg’s conclusion that the increase in the influx of
migrants to Europe in 2015 functioned as a catalyst for amplified immigration opposition, rather
than the rise of the Sweden Democrats.341 The lack of change among mainstream parties on
immigration issues before 2015 suggests that while the presence of a right-wing party is
important to advance anti-immigration rhetoric, societal conditions must also be favorable.342
This confirms the conditions for Sweden Democratic influence on the local level, as outlined by
Bolin et al., on a national level: before the party is able to influence politics, the Sweden
Democrats must gain political representation and the issue of immigration must attract popular
attention; the advancement of one or the other does not seem to significantly impact the
mainstream parties’ positions on immigration.
The examination of the similarities and differences between the Moderates, the Social
Democrats, and the Sweden Democrats 1998-2018 highlights that Swedish mainstream parties,
which have successfully blocked the influence of the Sweden Democrats in the past, are not so
different from other mainstream parties in Europe. In line with developments in other European
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countries, the Sweden Democratic emergence on the political stage occurred during a period of
policy convergence on immigration among mainstream parties; the Sweden Democrats’
increased strength also led to the advancement of Sweden Democratic rhetoric and policy among
the mainstream parties. This development runs contrary to Hochschild and Mollenkopf’s finding
that right-wing parties only have a limited impact on immigration policies in Europe. Despite the
mainstream parties’ shift on immigration and other related issues after 2015, and the Sweden
Democrats influence on political policy, these developments have not resulted in a similar
acceptance of the Sweden Democrats, and most mainstream parties still maintain a cordon
sanitaire against them. This development highlights that anti-immigration frames can be
successful despite the right-wing party advancing them being publicly opposed by mainstream
parties. Consequently, collaboration is not necessary for right-wing parties to influence politics.
The increased focus on immigration policy in recent years has also amplified the
discussion of migrants as a threat to Swedish society. Out of the 15 themes outlined by Dijk,343
the parties include eleven in their anti-immigration rhetoric. The parties critique the (1) volume
of immigration by proposing (2) stricter immigration policies and (3) highlighting safety
concerns. They also critique (4) immigrant neighborhood takeover, and (5) crime in relation to
immigration, in addition to (6) immigrants as welfare chauvinist with (7) distinct norms, (8)
language issues, and (9) different customs. The parties also emphasize (10) gender inequality
among immigrants and (11) their overall differentiation from Swedes. The parties have also
advanced an Islamophobic narrative in their election manifestos, as outlined by Hafez and others,
despite Rydgren and Ruth’s finding that immigration from non-European countries does not
increase anti-immigration sentiments among voters. The cultural opposition to immigration
derives from the Sweden Democrats’ ideological opposition to immigrants and is prominent in
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all their election manifestos. The party’s resistance to immigration has spread to the mainstream
parties and appear both as rhetorical gimmicks in political debates and as a central aspect of the
parties’ medium- to long-term strategy for immigration, as outlined in the election manifestos.
However, the ‘people versus elite’-narrative, as defined by Boumans, and Mols and Jetten, was
not a strong theme in the Swedish election manifestos; only the 1998 Sweden Democratic
manifesto highlighted this narrative.344 This divergence from previous studies highlight that,
while there are commonly recurring themes in the anti-immigration debate, there is no mold that
fits every country. The recent developments in Swedish politics highlight the importance of
continuously reexamining theories of mainstream parties’ relationship to right-wing parties.
While my findings align with Widfeldt’s conclusion that the rise of the Sweden Democrats
initially decreased the focus on immigration, the party’s continuous salience on the national
political stage and recent societal developments have impacted the rhetoric used by mainstream
parties to express opposition to immigration.
My examination of Swedish parties’ rhetoric on immigration and relating issues adds
additional support to some of the previously established theories on right-wing party influence,
while some models do not apply to the Swedish case. This does not mean that those theories are
not applicable to right-wing parties more broadly but highlights that the immigration debate
varies greatly between countries depending on the societal context. My wider approach to
immigration rhetoric, which includes immigration as well as related issues, is what sets my
research apart from previous attempts to trace right-wing party influence, both in Sweden and in
Europe; the extent to which right-wing parties can impact issues beyond immigration has not
been thoroughly examined in the past, though other issues are often directly connected to anti-
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immigration agendas. By examining issues relating to migration, as well as immigration rhetoric
more specifically, implications on the political system beyond immigration can be determined.
Based on my findings, I conclude that the mainstream parties in Sweden have not only
changed their position on immigration to a more restrictive posture. They have also shifted their
view of who the government should serve, from focusing more broadly on government services
for all people in Sweden, to highlighting the differences between services for citizens versus
non-permanent residents. These discussions are based on an anti-immigration frame, but spread
to discussions on education, welfare etc. as well. Thus, the Sweden Democrats, through their
impact on the immigration debate, have impacted the mainstream parties’ articulations on the
relationship between the government and the people. However, while the mainstream parties
have adopted a stricter view on immigration, which has impacted political issues directly tied to
migration, the Sweden Democrats have not successfully introduced any new issues to the
political debate. Instead, the party has expanded its policy positions on other issues to broaden its
political appeal, moving the Sweden Democrats closer to the mainstream parties on certain
issues. This development suggests that the success of the Sweden Democrats has radicalized the
mainstream parties’ position on immigration and other related issues, but deradicalized the
Sweden Democrats by increasing the party’s focus on issues beyond immigration. This change
highlights how both mainstream parties and right-wing parties reposition themselves to attract
voters in a changing political climate, which severely impacts the relationships between the
parties.
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Moderates

Translation

Social Democrats

Translation

Sweden Democrats

Translation

arbetskraftsinvandring
asyl*
fly*
hemländ
integr*
invandr*

Labor migration
Asylum*
Refuge*
Home countri*
Integr*
Immigra*

asyl*
flyk*
främlingsfient
invandr*
mångkulturell
nyanländ

anhöriginvandring
assimileringspolitik
asyl*
återvandring*
etnisk
fly*

Family reunification
Assimilation politics
Asylum*
Repatriation*
Ethnic
Refuge*

klan
medborg*
migra*
mottagarländ

Clan
Citizen*
Migra*
Receiving countri*

rasis*
segregation
språk*
svensk

Asylum*
Refuge*
Xenophob
Immigra*
Multi-cultural
Newly arrived
person/people
Racis*
Segregation
Language*
Swede/Swedish

fosterl*
hedersrelater
hemländ
hemspråksundervisning

nation*
nyanländ

Nation*
Newly arrived
person/people
Swedish for
immigrants
Language*
Swede/Swedish*
Sweden
Origin countr*
Foreign

sver
utländsk

Sweden
Foreign

integration*
invandr*

Motherland
Honor related
Home countri
Native language
education
Integration*
Immigra*

Islamisering

Islamization

mångkulturell*
massinvandring
medborg*
migrationspolitik
modersmålsundervisning

Multi-cultural*
Mass immigration
Citizen*
Migration politics
Native language
education
Muslim
Nation*
Nazism
Newly arrived
person/people

sfi
språk*
svensk*
sver
ursprungsl*
utländsk

muslim
nation*
nazism
Nyanländ

rasis*
ritualslak
segreg*
slöjor
språk*
svensk
sver
tradition
uppehållstillstånd
utländsk
utlänning
utvis*
västerländsk
Words included in Appendix A are words which showed a significant percentage in one or more election manifestos.

Racis*
Ritual slaughter
Segreg*
Veils
Language*
Swede/Swedish
Sweden
Tradition
Residency permit
Foreign
Foreigner
Deport*
Western
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Moderates

Translation

Social Democrats

Translation

Sweden Democrats

Translation

anhöriginvandring
förfölj
islamist
krig
kvotflyktingsystem
migrationspolitik
modersmål
nordisk
språkkunskap
svenskundervisning
uppehållstillstånd
utlandsföd
utlänningskontroll

Family reunification
Persecu
Islamist
War
Ratio refugee system
Migration politics
Native language
Nordic
Language knowledge
Swedish training
Residency permit
Foreign born
Immigration control

arbetskraftsinvandring
extremism
integration
kvotflyktingssy
medborg
nation/nationell
nordisk
ursprung

Labor migration
Extremism
Integration
Ratio refugee sy
Citizen
Nation/National
Nordic
Origin

arbetskraftsinvandring
invandrarungdom
kvotflykting
landet
migrationsverket
nordisk
språklektion
utlandsföd

Labor migration
Immigrant youth
Ratio refugee
Country
Migration authority
Nordic
Language lesson
Foreign born

Words included in appendix B are words which did not show a significant percentage by party in the election manifestos.
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Appendix C
Moderates

Social Democrats

Sweden Democrats

Begging (social issue)

Elder care (welfare)

Animal protection (social issues)

Borders (foreign policy)

Hate crimes (norms)

Assimilation (integration)

Business (integration)

International Collaboration (foreign policy)

Bilateralism (foreign policy)

Civics (migration policy)

Multiculturalism (norms)

Climate and Crime (social issues)

Competency evaluation (integration)

Religion and Education (norms)

Community (norms)

Conflict (foreign policy)

Swedish pride (norms)

Democracy (norms)

79

Control and support

Demography (social issues)

Entrepreneurship (integration)

Emergency personnel (social issues)

Establishment (integration)

Family (norms)

Foreign workers (economy)

Foreign aid (foreign policy)

Freedom, community,
(social issues)
Funding (economy)

Minority culture (integration)

non-discrimination

Pensions (welfare)

Government allowance (economy)

Quotas (social issues)

Humanitarian world power (migration policy)

Rural politics and Identity (norms)

Humanity (migration policy)

Terrorism (foreign policy)

Immigrants make Sweden better (norms)

Undocumented immigrants (migration policy)

Internal immigration controls
policy)
Money transfers (economy)
Opportunity (integration)
Policy (migration policy)
Radicalization (social issues)
Safe haven (norms)
Shade society (social issues)
Structural problems (integration)

(migration

Taxes (economy)
Unemployment (integration)
Words included in Appendix C only appeared in one party’s election manifesto.
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